


What Restraint? Five years of G20 Pledges on Trade

The 14th GTA Report

by Simon J. Evenett



GLOBAL
TRADE
ALERT

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Comprehensive: GTA complements and goes beyond the WTO, UNCTAD, and OECD's monitoring initiatives by identifying those trading partners likely to be harmed by state measures. The GTA considers a broader range of policy instruments than other monitoring initiatives.

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1 Executive Summary

Although protectionism was not responsible for the global economic crisis that became known to many as the Great Recession, five years ago the leaders of the G20 publicly committed themselves to a standstill on erecting new distortions to global commerce.¹ In the light of the experience of the 1930s, the importance of maintaining open trade and investment regimes was emphasised repeatedly.

While taking steps to rekindle economic growth, lower unemployment and restructure the financial sector are certainly important priorities for national governments at times such as these, the harm done by beggar-thy-neighbour policies should not be overlooked. Whether through tariffs, subsidies, or other less transparent (“murkier”) policies², such steps shift the pain of economic adjustment on to trading partners, masking competitive deficiencies rather than fixing them. That governments have so many options to tilt the playing field in favour of domestic firms, investors and workers is often conveniently ignored.

In the run up to the next G20 summit in St Petersburg, where according to reliable press reports one item on the agenda is the extension of its standstill on protectionism, it is worth asking what the G20 has actually achieved in this regard. This report draws upon nearly 3,800 reports of “good” and “bad” trade-related measures taken by governments across the globe since the standstill was announced at the first crisis-era G20 summit in November 2008. These reports were assembled by the independent Global Trade Alert (GTA) team and made freely and publicly available on its website.³ From these reports a comprehensive picture of the G20’s actions has been assembled, including the creation of six summary measures of each G20 member’s adherence to their pledge on protectionism.

The purpose, then, of this report is to provide the most comprehensive and up-to-date overview of G20 policies towards cross-border commerce since the

1 Chapter 3 of this report states and then assesses the references to this standstill in the communiqués issued after each summit of the G20 Leaders. These references are more revealing than one might expect.

2 Governments can impose covertly or overtly conditions on recipients of crisis-era state largesse that can distort trade, investment, and migration flows. Such largesse can include bailouts for underperforming firms, consumption and wage subsidies, export finance, import and export tax rebates, value added tax rebates, and permissions to invest in a jurisdiction. Moreover, these conditions have been imposed by local as well as central governments. In addition, state financial support need not come directly from the national treasury, but also from state-owned or state-linked banks. Tracing financial support that does not come directly from central governments is particularly difficult and makes it hard for a firm to assess the costs of foreign rivals.

3 www.globaltradealert.org

first crisis-era G20 summit nearly five years ago and to see if the G20's deeds on protectionism have matched its fine words. The implications of these findings for the St Petersburg G20 Summit are also discussed.

Even G20 leaders have their doubts

Any assessment of an international initiative requires a benchmark, influenced no doubt by our expectations of the actors involved. In this regard, as documented in Chapter 3 of this report, at its November 2008 summit the G20 Leaders pledged:

“...we will refrain from raising new barriers to investment or to trade in goods and services, imposing new export restrictions, or implementing World Trade Organization (WTO) inconsistent measures to stimulate exports.” (paragraph 13)

Known as a standstill in trade policy circles, such initiatives had been tried before in the 1930s and in the sharp global downturn in the early 1980s. A key feature of the latest standstill is that it is non-binding and was implemented outside of the WTO legal structure, so violations of the G20 standstill do not automatically constitute violations of WTO rules, the latter exposing the perpetrator to legally binding judgements and possible sanctions under the WTO dispute settlement system. That the G20 Leaders chose to confine the WTO's role to monitoring was telling.

It is also noteworthy that the G20 standstill was not limited to tariffs and quotas, perhaps reflecting the realisation that there are many ways in which governments can beggar-thy-neighbour. Indeed, the communiqué following the last G20 summit in Los Cabos, Mexico, referred to “resisting protectionism *in all its forms*” (paragraph 26, italics added).

While officials from many G20 governments have tried to brush aside – in public at least – concerns about the effectiveness of the standstill on protectionism, it is revealing that the G20 Leaders themselves expressed the following reservation in the Los Cabos Declaration:

“We are deeply concerned about rising instances of protectionism around the world.”
(paragraph 28)

This explicit reference to crisis-era protectionism followed more oblique remarks in previous communiqués about the desirability of rolling back or rectifying protectionist measures that might have arisen. All in all, it would seem that blanket defences of the G20 standstill on protectionism are hard to sustain in the light of the G20 Leaders' own words. But what of the facts? Just how bad is the G20's record on protectionism?

Assessed properly, the G20's resort to protectionism has picked up over time

That so many beggar-thy-neighbour acts take time to document biases the data reported on G20 protectionism, skewing assessments in favour of a more benign interpretation of the G20's record. Before considering the data, it is worth recalling that tariff changes and investigations against dumped imports, subsidised imports and import surges garner a lot more publicity than many other state measures that tilt the playing field. Some measures, such as state-directed bailouts through national banks for firms facing international competition, tend to come to light after months and sometimes years, if they ever see the light of day. Moreover, the reporting requirements on WTO members, another potentially valuable source of information, are stronger for more transparent policy instruments that were the subject of yesteryear's trade frictions. In short, experience has shown that the initial assessments of recent government policies towards cross-border commerce underestimate the true extent of state intervention.

Figure 1.1 Failure to correct for reporting lags hides the 2012 jump in protectionism imposed by the G20




Figure 1.1 demonstrates the importance of reporting lags in interpreting the record of the G20 on protectionism. The left-hand panel reports, as of 19 August 2013, how many times the G20 countries undertook beggar-thy-neighbour actions since 2009, the first complete calendar year after the November 2008 standstill commitment was made. On 19 August 2013, the GTA database included reports on a total of 345 instances of protectionism⁴ imposed by G20 members during 2009, a calendar year that was concluded almost 15 quarters ago. For the calendar year 2012, which ended nearly three quarters ago, the comparable total is already 335. Still, casual inspection of the left-hand panel of Figure 1 might give the impression that the resort to protectionism by the G20 has been

⁴ Throughout this report, and others by the Global Trade Alert team, the term “protectionism” is used synonymously with “beggar-thy-neighbour” policies. As modern cross-border commerce involves more than trade in goods, confining the definition of protectionism to policies that restrict imports or stimulate exports is unwarranted.

steady since 2009, which some might “spin” to the media and the public as protectionism being “under control.”⁵

Better apple-for-apple comparisons of the annual resort to protectionism by the G20 can be obtained by asking, at the same point in time in the reporting cycle, how many measures in a given calendar year had been found, documented, and published by the GTA team. Given that the statistics for this report were assembled on 19 August 2013, following a considerable update and extension of the underlying database over the summer, this date is perhaps as good as any. In fact, a date in the third quarter of the year allows for at least two full quarters of investigation and reporting since the completion of a given calendar year.

The right-hand panel of Figure 1 shows the total number of protectionist measures implemented by the G20 countries in a calendar year that had been reported by 19 August of the following year. By 19 August 2010, then, 273 protectionist measures imposed by the G20 countries in 2009 had been documented. By 19 August 2013, the comparable total for G20 measures imposed in 2012 was 335. Indeed, a comparison of these annual totals suggests that the resort to protectionism in 2011 was 6% higher than in 2009 and, worse still, the resort to protectionism in 2012 was 23% higher than in 2009. A less sanguine picture of G20 restraint emerges once reporting lags are taken into account. Whatever bite the standstill had seems to have diminished over time. But did the standstill have any bite in the first place?

The G20’s resort to protectionism pales when compared to mid-sized trading nations

G20 countries pledged not to introduce new forms of protectionism while other trading nations did not – or at least did not do so in the same high profile manner. If the G20 standstill bit, surely it would show up in the aggregate statistics on the resort to and rolling back of crisis-era protectionism? Moreover, surely the G20’s performance on those metrics should exceed those of nations that did not make this standstill pledge?

To explore this matter objectively, the G20 nations’ performance was compared with the ten next largest trading nations (as measured by the sum of their total value of annual imports and exports).⁶ An alternative might be to compare the

5 In fact, these annual totals for 2009 to 2012 represent a sharp jump on the annualised rate of protectionist G20 measures implemented during the months November and December 2008, immediately after the standstill was supposed to come into effect. The total number of protectionist measures implemented by the G20 during those two months implied an annualised rate of 204 measures, much less than the 345 measures found so far for the calendar year 2009.

6 In identifying the next 10 largest trading nations outside of the G20, it is worth bearing in mind that the EU is a member of the G20. Hence, several medium-sized and smaller EU economies with large amount of imports and exports were excluded from the “Next 10.” Ultimately, data on the following countries was used to calculate the statistics for the “Next 10”: Chile, Iran, Israel, Malaysia, Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, and Viet Nam. Some of the “Next 10” countries are members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Community (APEC), which collectively made less prominent pledges to eschew protectionism during the global economic crisis. Monitoring of APEC nation compliance with such pledges has been less frequent than for the G20 countries and the associated policy choices have received considerably less public scrutiny.

G20 nations with the rest of the world's resort to protectionism, but the mid-sized trading nations are likely to have more in common with the G20 than the large number of tiny island economies and others that would affect the average statistics for the rest of the world.

Using data on the G20 and what is referred to here as the "Next 10" mid-sized trading nations, the following summary statistics on their resort to protectionism and propensity to roll back crisis-era protectionism were calculated:

1. The share of all commerce-affecting measures implemented since November 2008 that harm foreign commercial interests (a measure of the incidence of protectionism since the standstill pledge was first taken in November 2008).
2. The share of all commerce-affecting measures implemented since the last G20 summit in Los Cabos, Mexico that harm foreign commercial interests (a measure of the incidence of protectionism over the past year, since the G20 Leaders publicly expressed reservation about rising protectionism).
3. The share of protectionist measures imposed since November 2008 that remain to be unwound (an indicator of the degree to which commitments to roll back protectionism have not been adhered to).
4. The share of tariff lines (that is, categories of products traded) that are affected by protectionist measures that have been implemented since November 2008 (another indicator of the scale of protectionism implemented since the G20 standstill was first announced).
5. The share of tariff lines that are still affected by protectionist measures that were implemented since November 2008 and have not yet been unwound (another indicator of failure to roll back protectionism).
6. The share of protectionist measures imposed since November 2008 that are not tariff increases or measures against dumped imports, subsidised imports, or import surges; the latter being examples of easily spotted, relatively well regulated, and transparent forms of protectionism (an indicator of the extent to which governments have resorted to "murkier" beggar-thy-neighbour policies that are not so tightly governed by WTO rules as tariffs, etc.).


These six measures were deliberately constructed to lie between zero and one, with higher values indicating a greater departure from the G20 commitments on resisting protectionism and rolling it back. For each nation or group of nations the values of these six measures are depicted on a traditional radar chart, which looks like a spider's web. In our case, the further the line connecting the six scores is from the centre of the web, the greater the jurisdiction in question's departure from these G20 commitments.

In Figure 1.2, the performance of the average⁷ G20 nation is compared to the average Next 10 nation on these six metrics. What is striking is that, on all but one criteria, the performance of the G20 members is not markedly better than the Next 10 mid-sized trading nations. The mix between liberalising and protectionist measures is more skewed towards beggar-thy-neighbour measures among the G20 nations, the protectionism imposed by G20 nations affects more product categories, and the G20 nations have unwound less crisis-era protectionism than the Next 10 mid-sized trading nations.

Yet the average G20 member resorted to murky protectionism half the time, while the average Next 10 nation resorted to murky protectionism nearly two-thirds of the time they chose to tilt the playing field towards domestic commercial interests. While murky protectionism is of interest – previous research showing its prevalence since the onset of the Great Recession – strictly speaking the G20 standstill does not distinguish between protectionism of different degrees of transparency.

When faced with the same systemic economic crisis, the countries that pledged at the G20 not to erect new trade barriers and the like, in fact, raised them by more than those that made no such pledge. These findings speak badly of the G20 standstill on protectionism.

Figure 1.2 Only in the resort to murky protectionism did the G20 clearly outperform the Next 10 trading nations



⁷ The averages are calculated using weights based on the share of a nation's total trade in the respective group's total trade.

Some G20 members are more protectionist than others

While the G20 as a group has performed worse than the 10 largest mid-sized trading nations, there is considerable variation across the G20 in their resort to protectionism, in rolling back protectionism and in the number of times they have harmed their trading partners. This report includes a diagram similar to Figure 1.2 for each G20 member as well as a map showing the number of times each G20 member has harmed each of its trading partners across the globe.. For country detail, see these diagrams and maps listed in the Table of Contents. Here, however, three figures (3 to 5) highlight important aspects of the variation across the G20.


Each point in Figure 1.3 refers to a G20 member. This figure contains three findings. First, since November 2008 there has been considerable variation across the G20 members in the propensity for trade-related interventions to be protectionist. Still, in all but one G20 member, more than half of interventions affecting international commerce impose harm on trading partners' exporters, foreign investments or overseas workers (see the horizontal axis of Figure 3).

Second, compared to the propensity to resort to protectionism, the variation across G20 members in the propensity to resort to murky protectionism is greater. Third, over the past five years the G20 countries where the protectionist impulse has been stronger tend to be those G20 members that also resorted more often to less transparent – or murkier – means.

Bear in mind that many of those murkier forms of protection are subject to weak or no WTO rules. When governments of the largest economies of the world have come under considerable pressure to favour domestic commercial interests, they have tended to circumvent WTO disciplines by avoiding policies subject to more demanding multilateral rules. Since the global economic crisis began, those rules have probably altered the composition of protectionism rather than the amount of it.

Figure 1.4 compares the resort to protectionism and propensity to roll it back across the BRICs and across four richer industrialised nations. The latter comprise Canada, Germany, Japan and the United States and statistics of the six metrics mentioned earlier can be found for each of these nations in the bottom panel of Figure 1.4. Meanwhile, the performance of each of the four BRICs is shown in the top panel. It is evident that there is variation among each group as well as between these two groups of G20 members.

Figure 1.3 Those G20 countries that discriminated against foreign commercial interests more often also employed more murkier forms of protectionism



In the five years since the first crisis-era G20 summit, protectionism by the BRICs tended to cover more product categories than the richer “Quad” mentioned above. In contrast, a higher proportion of the trade-related measures imposed by the latter over both the past year and over the past five years are protectionist. In this regard, it is worth bearing in mind that the BRICs have imposed more than twice as many protectionist measures over the past five years as the four industrialised countries examined here. Finally, the BRICs resort to murky protectionism less often.

Since the first crisis-era G20 summit, there has been considerable variation over time as to which G20 members have been responsible for the bulk of protectionist measures imposed by the G20 group, as shown in Figure 1.5. In 2009, more than half of the protectionist measures implemented by the G20 group were imposed by the member states of the EU (acting individually or collectively), by Japan or by the United States. The contribution of these countries fell sharply after 2009. The BRICs’ share of G20 protectionism reached nearly 50 per cent in 2010 before falling back in 2011 and 2012. In the year to date (2013), the BRICs share has jumped again, but the reporting lags mentioned earlier suggest that these initial findings should be treated with some caution.

Taken together, the BRICs, the EU, Japan and the United States together account for no less than 60 per cent of all G20 protectionism during each year since 2009. In 2009, these jurisdictions alone were responsible for over 90 per cent of all G20 protectionism imposed and, for that matter, 56 per cent of all protectionism imposed worldwide during that year. By 2012, of interest because of the spike in G20 protectionism documented earlier, these percentages had fallen to 64 and 45, respectively.

Figure 1.4 Protectionist dynamics differ among leading G20 nations







Figure 1.5 Those responsible for the bulk of G20 protectionism has varied since 2009



90 per cent of crisis-era G20 protectionism still needs to be unwound

Another shadow over the G20 promises on trade is cast by the evidence on the degree to which protectionism imposed since November 2008 has been unwound. Figure 1.6 shows, for each calendar year since 2009, what percentage of protectionism imposed in a given year has been unwound subsequently. Even in 2009, the best year by far in this respect, over three-quarters of beggar-thy-neighbour measures have not lapsed or been unwound. Unless crisis-era protectionism is unwound, it risks become a permanent feature in the world economy. One lesson from history is that bouts of protectionism tend to take decades to be removed or negotiated away.

Figure 1.6 Little G20 protectionism has been unwound – so much more needs to be done



Implications for the St Petersburg G20 Summit

In the light of the evidence presented here, covering the entire period since the G20 first adopted its standstill on protectionism, the current G20 approach to promoting open trade and investment regimes is not fit for purpose. In recent years, not only have G20 members resorted to protectionism more frequently than at the beginning of the crisis, they have rolled back few crisis-era beggar-thy-neighbour measures. This means that the stock of crisis-era protectionist measures imposed by the G20 nations just keeps on growing.

As of the end of August 2013, the G20 members have implemented a total of 1527 beggar-thy-neighbour measures since they adopted their standstill on protectionism in November 2008. Just under 89 per cent of these protectionist measures remain to be unwound. Furthermore, G20 resistance to protectionism and promoting its rollback is worse than the mid-sized trading nations that did not take this standstill pledge. The glaring flaws in the G20's "softly, softly" approach are apparent.

Given its record on protectionism, the choice before the G20 members is to "mend it or end it." If the non-binding G20 approach is to amount to peer pressure rather than peer protection, then monitoring of the protectionist pledges must not only be stepped up, but also acted upon. Sweeping these matters under the carpet and pulling punches – when unsparing criticism of breaches is needed – hasn't delivered and won't deliver, all of which undermines the credibility of the G20. The only silver lining to the G20's woeful record is that the WTO looks more effective, relatively speaking.

Assuming that the goal of G20's work on protectionism is still to resist it, serious consideration should be given as to whether the deliberative functions of the WTO could be deployed to highlight and analyse crisis-era protectionism and to encourage its unwinding. In sectors where beggar-thy-neighbour activity has been most intense (see Table 2.9 in Chapter 2), initiatives could be devised in Geneva to promote simultaneous unwinding of protectionism over time – the commercial policy equivalent of mutual disarmament. For sure, WTO processes can take time and can get bogged down, but after the last five years, the leading non-binding alternative has hardly covered itself in glory.

Organisation of the remainder of this report

Following this Executive Summary, charts and maps summarising each G20 country's resort to protectionism and rolling back of protectionism are presented. An overview of global protectionism can then be found in Chapter 2.


Having presented the global landscape of protectionism, the remaining chapters focus on the policy choices of the G20 members. To set the scene, the evolving G20 commitments and statements on protectionism are described in Chapter 3. While diplomatic communiqués are not always that revealing, there are interesting changes over time in the manner in which the G20 chose to characterise its work on protectionism.

In Chapter 4 further information on the commercial policy stance of G20 governments since the first crisis-era summit is presented and interpreted. Given the importance of reporting lags to interpreting the G20 record of protectionism, this matter is taken up in Chapter 5 in more detail than presented here.

PART ONE

Benchmarking the G20's Resort to Protectionism and Trade Liberalisation


Argentina: 209 harmful measures imposed since November 2008



ARGENTINA


The six criteria employed here are described in the Executive Summary. Each score lies between zero and one, with higher scores reflecting larger deviations from G20 commitments. The extent of compliance with G20 pledges can vary across these six criteria. Even so, the further the line is away from the centre of the radar diagram, the lower is the compliance with G20 pledges on protectionism and its rollback.

Australia:
47 harmful measures imposed since November 2008



The six criteria employed here are described in the Executive Summary. Each score lies between zero and one, with higher scores reflecting larger deviations from G20 commitments. The extent of compliance with G20 pledges can vary across these six criteria. Even so, the further the line is away from the centre of the radar diagram, the lower is the compliance with G20 pledges on protectionism and its rollback.


Brazil: 109 harmful measures imposed since November 2008



BRAZIL


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Canada: 46 harmful measures imposed since November 2008



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
China: 111 harmful measures imposed since November 2008



CHINA


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European Commission: 76 harmful measures imposed since November 2008



The six criteria employed here are described in the Executive Summary. Each score lies between zero and one, with higher scores reflecting larger deviations from G20 commitments. The extent of compliance with G20 pledges can vary across these six criteria. Even so, the further the line is away from the centre of the radar diagram, the lower is the compliance with G20 pledges on protectionism and its rollback.

France:
109 harmful measures imposed since November 2008




FRANCE

The six criteria employed here are described in the Executive Summary. Each score lies between zero and one, with higher scores reflecting larger deviations from G20 commitments. The extent of compliance with G20 pledges can vary across these six criteria. Even so, the further the line is away from the centre of the radar diagram, the lower is the compliance with G20 pledges on protectionism and its rollback.

Germany:


116 harmful measures imposed since November 2008



The six criteria employed here are described in the Executive Summary. Each score lies between zero and one, with higher scores reflecting larger deviations from G20 commitments. The extent of compliance with G20 pledges can vary across these six criteria. Even so, the further the line is away from the centre of the radar diagram, the lower is the compliance with G20 pledges on protectionism and its rollback.

India:


144 harmful measures imposed since November 2008



INDIA

The six criteria employed here are described in the Executive Summary. Each score lies between zero and one, with higher scores reflecting larger deviations from G20 commitments. The extent of compliance with G20 pledges can vary across these six criteria. Even so, the further the line is away from the centre of the radar diagram, the lower is the compliance with G20 pledges on protectionism and its rollback.


Indonesia: 75 harmful measures imposed since November 2008



The six criteria employed here are described in the Executive Summary. Each score lies between zero and one, with higher scores reflecting larger deviations from G20 commitments. The extent of compliance with G20 pledges can vary across these six criteria. Even so, the further the line is away from the centre of the radar diagram, the lower is the compliance with G20 pledges on protectionism and its rollback.


Italy:

109 harmful measures imposed since November 2008




The six criteria employed here are described in the Executive Summary. Each score lies between zero and one, with higher scores reflecting larger deviations from G20 commitments. The extent of compliance with G20 pledges can vary across these six criteria. Even so, the further the line is away from the centre of the radar diagram, the lower is the compliance with G20 pledges on protectionism and its rollback.

Japan: 86 harmful measures imposed since November 2008



The six criteria employed here are described in the Executive Summary. Each score lies between zero and one, with higher scores reflecting larger deviations from G20 commitments. The extent of compliance with G20 pledges can vary across these six criteria. Even so, the further the line is away from the centre of the radar diagram, the lower is the compliance with G20 pledges on protectionism and its rollback.


Mexico:
30 harmful measures imposed since November 2008



MEXICO


The six criteria employed here are described in the Executive Summary. Each score lies between zero and one, with higher scores reflecting larger deviations from G20 commitments. The extent of compliance with G20 pledges can vary across these six criteria. Even so, the further the line is away from the centre of the radar diagram, the lower is the compliance with G20 pledges on protectionism and its rollback.

**Republic of Korea:
26 harmful measures imposed since November 2008**



The six criteria employed here are described in the Executive Summary. Each score lies between zero and one, with higher scores reflecting larger deviations from G20 commitments. The extent of compliance with G20 pledges can vary across these six criteria. Even so, the further the line is away from the centre of the radar diagram, the lower is the compliance with G20 pledges on protectionism and its rollback.


Russian Federation: 269 harmful measures imposed since November 2008



RUSSIAN FEDERATION


The six criteria employed here are described in the Executive Summary. Each score lies between zero and one, with higher scores reflecting larger deviations from G20 commitments. The extent of compliance with G20 pledges can vary across these six criteria. Even so, the further the line is away from the centre of the radar diagram, the lower is the compliance with G20 pledges on protectionism and its rollback.

Saudi Arabia: 18 harmful measures imposed since November 2008



The six criteria employed here are described in the Executive Summary. Each score lies between zero and one, with higher scores reflecting larger deviations from G20 commitments. The extent of compliance with G20 pledges can vary across these six criteria. Even so, the further the line is away from the centre of the radar diagram, the lower is the compliance with G20 pledges on protectionism and its rollback.


South Africa: 49 harmful measures imposed since November 2008



SOUTH AFRICA


The six criteria employed here are described in the Executive Summary. Each score lies between zero and one, with higher scores reflecting larger deviations from G20 commitments. The extent of compliance with G20 pledges can vary across these six criteria. Even so, the further the line is away from the centre of the radar diagram, the lower is the compliance with G20 pledges on protectionism and its rollback.

Turkey: 46 harmful measures imposed since November 2008



The six criteria employed here are described in the Executive Summary. Each score lies between zero and one, with higher scores reflecting larger deviations from G20 commitments. The extent of compliance with G20 pledges can vary across these six criteria. Even so, the further the line is away from the centre of the radar diagram, the lower is the compliance with G20 pledges on protectionism and its rollback.


United Kingdom: 114 harmful measures imposed since November 2008



UNITED KINGDOM

The six criteria employed here are described in the Executive Summary. Each score lies between zero and one, with higher scores reflecting larger deviations from G20 commitments. The extent of compliance with G20 pledges can vary across these six criteria. Even so, the further the line is away from the centre of the radar diagram, the lower is the compliance with G20 pledges on protectionism and its rollback.


United States of America: 58 harmful measures imposed since November 2008




The six criteria employed here are described in the Executive Summary. Each score lies between zero and one, with higher scores reflecting larger deviations from G20 commitments. The extent of compliance with G20 pledges can vary across these six criteria. Even so, the further the line is away from the centre of the radar diagram, the lower is the compliance with G20 pledges on protectionism and its rollback.

G20

Map 1 Worldwide incidence of harm done by all G20 protectionist measures




Map 2 Worldwide incidence of protectionist measures harming G20




ARGENTINA

Map 3 Argentina: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's protectionist measures




Map 4 Australia: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's protectionist measures




AUSTRALIA

BRAZIL

Map 5 Brazil: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's protectionist measures




Map 6 Canada: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's protectionist measures




CHINA

Map 7 China: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's protectionist measures




Map 8 EU27: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's protectionist measures




EUROPEAN UNION

FRANCE

Map 9 France: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's protectionist measures




Map 10 Germany: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's protectionist measures




GERMANY

INDIA

Map 11 India: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's protectionist measures




Map 12 Indonesia: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's protectionist measures




INDONESIA

ITALY

Map 13 Italy: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's protectionist measures




Map 14 Japan: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's protectionist measures




MEXICO

Map 15 Mexico: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's protectionist measures




Map 16 Republic of Korea: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's protectionist measures




REPUBLIC OF KOREA

RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Map 16 Russian Federation: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's protectionist measures




Map 17 Saudi Arabia: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's protectionist measures




SAUDI ARABIA

SOUTH AFRICA

Map 18 South Africa: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's protectionist measures




Map 20 Turkey: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's protectionist measures




TURKEY

UNITED KINGDOM

Map 21 United Kingdom: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's protectionist measures



Map 22 United States of America: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's protectionist measures



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PART TWO

Five Years of Crisis-Era Protectionsim

2 The Global Landscape of Protectionism Five Years On

While this is principally a report about the G20's commercial policy choices, other countries are also making decisions as to how to treat foreign commercial interests vis-à-vis domestic rivals. Non-G20 countries may choose to copy steps taken by the governments of the 20 largest economies, or at least use the latter's choices as a rationale or excuse. Moreover, since G20 firms export to and operate in non-G20 countries, information on the latter is important as well. For these reasons, this chapter is devoted to reporting and discussing protectionism from a global, as opposed to a G20, perspective.

This chapter is organised into two sections. The first describes the steps taken to update the GTA database since the 12th report was published in June 2013. The principal features of protectionism nearly five years after the first crisis-era G20 summit are described in the second section.

2.1. The latest update of the GTA database

The key elements of the methodology used to classify and update government measures that may have some bearing on international commerce was not altered for the preparation of this report. Readers are referred to the 11th report of Global Trade Alert for an account of the motivation and methodology employed here.

As noted in the 12th report, there was considerable turnover in the GTA staff in the third quarter of 2012 and this provided an opportunity to upgrade working and oversight procedures. As the new team's experience has grown, there may have been a pickup in reporting rates. With the assembly of the new team, a strengthened review process was put in place. More measures proposed for publication have been being rejected and, where necessary, revisions are sought for proposed measures. The latter may slow down the time to publication but there is a payoff in terms of higher quality.

Furthermore, over the summer of 2013 three more colleagues undertook projects that have added to the GTA database. This was in addition to the contributions of extra staff with the language skills and trade expertise to better cover some of the larger developing countries.

One colleague reviewed systematically the GTA database for duplicate measures. Duplicate measures have tended to arise when an entry for a trade defence investigation is not updated properly and a new entry is erroneously

made instead. Over time, the team member responsible for trade defence measures has removed most of these duplicates, but it was important to check the database again.

A second colleague focused on expanding the coverage of measures taken by Latin American countries and this resulted in more entries being made into the database. Another consequence is that Argentina and Brazil account for a smaller share of the total number of Latin American measures. Users interested in that region may find this expansion of coverage helpful.

Unjustified expropriations of foreign investments were the focus of the work of another colleague. News databases, such as FACTIVE and Google News, were searched systematically for phrases associated with expropriations and potential cases identified and then investigated further. Moreover, known investment disputes were checked to see if other instances of expropriation had occurred since the Washington, DC G20 summit in November 2008. A number of reports on expropriated investments have now been published on the GTA website and more reports are being revised and evaluated for potential publication.

Towards the end of the expropriation project, the same colleague launched a search for local content requirements and other performance requirements that governments might have imposed since November 2008. Again, leading news sources were searched as well as documents from international organisations. A tentative list of over 100 examples of such requirements has been assembled and will be investigated further in the months to come. In the future, a review of available information on export taxes and restrictions will be undertaken. The OECD has taken great strides in adding to the evidence about such export measures and some of these measures have become the subject of high-profile disputes at the WTO.

As a result of deploying these additional staff, a total of 450 measures were added to the GTA database between June 2013 and mid-August 2013. This doubled the average monthly rate for the previous 12 months, which in turn was an improvement on the rate achieved before. The GTA database now has 3,784 reports on planned or implemented government measures that affect international commerce.

The latest update, plus its predecessor, provide a trove of information about government policy changes since the last G20 Summit in Los Cabos, Mexico. The GTA database contains reports on 805 government measures that have been implemented worldwide since that summit was concluded. Of those 805 measures, 589 discriminated against some foreign commercial interest. If attention is restricted to measures implemented by the G20, then the totals are 522 and 383, respectively. On average, in every week since the Los Cabos summit, the G20 nations have together implemented six protectionist measures.

2.2. Principal features of global protectionism five years after the crisis began

1. Of the 3,784 state measures taken since November 2008 that are included in the GTA database, 2,134 almost certainly worsened the treatment of some foreign commercial interest. To this must be added the 261 implemented state measures that likely harmed foreign commercial interests. The number of liberalising or transparency-improving measures proposed since November 2008 was 845. See Tables 2.1 and 2.2.
2. The number of discriminatory measures implemented (2,395) exceeded the number of liberalising and transparency-improving measures implemented (845) by nearly three to one. Restricting consideration to state measures other than trade defence reduces this ratio to around 2.5:1.
3. The total number of almost discriminatory and likely discriminatory measures that are no longer in force (346) exceeds the number of unwound liberalising and transparency-improving measures (125), again by nearly three to one. See Table 2.1.
4. The total number of almost certainly discriminatory measures in the GTA database has expanded more than 10 per cent since the last report was issued in June 2013. A total of 219 such measures have been found, a number that falls to 186 once trade defence instruments are excluded. See Table 2.1.
5. As noted earlier, since the last G20 summit in Los Cabos, 589 measures that almost certainly discriminate or likely discriminate against foreign commercial interests have been implemented. Of those protectionist measures, 383 were implemented by G20 countries. This implies that over 200 protectionist measures were implemented by other countries.
6. Together, the G20 countries have implemented 1,359 almost certainly discriminatory measures and 168 likely discriminatory measures since November 2008. Of the total (1,527), 430 were trade defence measures. This confirms one finding in GTA's 12th report, namely, that 72 per cent of all protectionist measures implemented by the G20 during the crisis era were measures other than antidumping, countervailing duties and safeguards actions. See Table 2.3.
7. Since November 2008, the G20 countries have not just implemented discriminatory measures. Together these countries are also responsible for 466 liberalising and transparency-improving measures. Still, for the G20 countries, the number of discriminatory measures outnumbers the latter measures by more than three to one. See Table 2.3.

8. The G20 countries are responsible for 63.5 per cent of all protectionist measures taken worldwide since the first crisis-era G20 summit in November 2008. Of the protectionist measures taken worldwide since the Los Cabos Summit, the G20 is responsible for 65 per cent, which represents no significant change from the percentage for the year June 2012-June 2013. See Table 2.2.
9. Of the protectionist measures still in force worldwide, the G20 countries are responsible for two-thirds. Computed from Tables 2.1-2.3.
10. In Figure 2.1, the rate at which protectionist measures were imposed since the November 2008 G20 summit was plotted. The spike in measures implemented in Q4 2012 continues to stand out; however, an increase in quarterly rates of protectionism from Q4 2011 on is now evident. Estimates of quarterly rates of protectionism in the first half of 2013 are not encouraging.
11. A sharp jump up in the number of protectionist measures was seen in Q1 2009, with over 180 measures imposed in that quarter alone. In addition to the spike in protectionism witnessed in Q4 2012, there has been a general upward revision in the number of protectionist measures implemented, even in those quarters where initially the quarterly totals were below average. See Figure 2.1.
12. Figure 2.1 also contains information on the number of protectionist measures that have been unwound. This matter was discussed in the Executive Summary for the G20 nations. Like those nations, the worldwide quarterly totals for unwinding tend to be larger in 2009 than in subsequent years.
13. In terms of the number of times that its commercial interests have been harmed by protectionism since November 2008, China has been hit by 953 almost certainly discriminatory measures and another 130 measures that are likely to be discriminatory. No other country or group of countries (such as the European Union) has been hit so often. These statistics imply that 45 per cent of all protectionist measures implemented worldwide harm Chinese commercial interests. See Tables 2.2 and 2.5.
14. Seven jurisdictions have seen their commercial interests hit more than 500 times since November 2008. All seven are G20 members. See Table 2.5.
15. The GTA does not calculate the amount of commerce affected by each state measure, nor the associated welfare impact. To do so for nearly 3,800 state measures would be exceptionally resource-intensive. Instead, four intermediate metrics of harm done by a jurisdiction are reported: the

number of almost certainly (red) discriminatory measures, the number of tariff lines affected by almost certainly discriminatory measures, the number of sectors affected by almost certainly discriminatory measures, and the number of trading partners harmed by a jurisdiction's almost certainly discriminatory measures. All the trading jurisdictions in the GTA database are ranked in descending order on these four metrics and the top 10 offenders on each category are reported in Table 2.6. As in our previous reports, it is remarkable how often G20 countries and the European Union are mentioned in the lists of top 10 offending nations.

16. In terms of discriminatory measures imposed, number of economic sectors affected, and number of trading partners harmed, the EU 27 is the still worst offender. In terms of tariff lines affected, Vietnam is ranked worst due to repeated competitive currency devaluations. See Table 2.6.
17. Argentina, China, Germany, India and Italy are listed in three of the four top 10 list of worst offenders. The current G20 host, the Russian Federation, is found in two of the top 10 lists. See Table 2.6.
18. With respect to the policy instruments that discriminate against foreign commercial interests, in terms of the total number of measures implemented, trade-distorting bailouts now shares the top spot with trade defence measures. In terms of measures still in force, trade defence measures are still more prevalent. However, as noted in prior reports, given that antidumping and countervailing duty actions target a limited number of specified trading partners, the number of jurisdictions harmed by the effects of discriminatory bailouts is still double that of trade defence instruments. As a first approximation, bailouts remain where a lot of the action is in crisis-era protectionism. See Table 2.7 and Figure 2.1.
19. Table 2.7 also implies that there has been a considerable increase in the number of reported bailouts, trade defence measures resulting in duties etc., tariff increases and export subsidies. See Table 2.7.
20. The traditional forms of protectionism – tariff increases and trade defence instruments – still account for approximately 37 per cent of the worldwide total of almost certainly discriminatory (red) measures implemented since November 2008. In terms of measures still in force, the respective percentage is 43, an increase over our previous report. Even so, non-traditional forms of protection still constitute the majority of cases of crisis-era protectionism. See Table 2.7.
21. The fact that so many of the top 10 most used protectionist instruments are subject to weak or no WTO rules confirms an earlier GTA finding – namely, that governments under pressure during the crisis era have circumvented the tougher, binding multilateral trade rules.

22. The increased resort to trade defence instruments since the beginning of 2012 – a feature common in previous business cycle downturns in many countries – merits a closer look. Table 2.8 was assembled with this in mind. A total of 476 trade defence measures restricting imports are currently in force. Another 273 investigations are under way.
23. As shown in Figure 2.3, ongoing trade defence investigations account for 52 per cent of the policy measures that have been announced or initiated but where, to date, no discrimination against foreign commercial interests has been implemented.
24. Sustaining a finding from the last report, agricultural products – a development-sensitive sector – have been the economic sector most hit by almost certainly (red) discriminatory measures since November 2008. In terms of measures still in force, the sector most hit is basic chemicals. See Table 2.8.
25. While discriminatory bailouts in the financial sector have received a lot of attention during the crisis, just over 6 per cent of the total number of implemented protectionist measures in the GTA database affected this sector. Moreover, less than a fifth of the total number of discriminatory bailouts and subsidies recorded in the GTA database relate to the financial sector. Both findings suggest that the GTA findings are not unduly skewed by the inclusion of the financial sector in the database. This data was extracted using the GTA website's advanced search function.

Table 2.1 Total number of state measures reported in the GTA database

Statistic	This report (September 2013)		Increase from previous report (June 2013)	
	Total	Total except unfair trade and safeguard measures	Total	Total except unfair trade and safeguard measures
Total number of measures in GTA database	3784	2893	450	399
Total number of measures coded green	845	838	167	167
of which currently in force	668	661	126	126
of which no longer in force	125	125	37	37
Total number of measures coded amber	805	438	64	46
of which currently in force	235	229	28	29
of which no longer in force	26	26	7	7
Total number of measures coded red	2134	1617	219	186
of which currently in force	1814	1338	201	167
of which no longer in force	320	279	22	22

Table 2.2 Measures implemented since the first crisis related G20 summit in November 2008, totals for all Jurisdictions and change since the report in June 2013

Statistic	This report (September 2013)		Increase from previous report (June 2013)	
	Total	Total except unfair trade and safeguard measures	Total	Total except unfair trade and safeguard measures
Total number of measures in GTA database	3187	2657	420	387
Total number of measures coded green	793	786	163	163
Total number of measures coded amber	261	255	35	36
Total number of measures coded red	2133	1616	222	188
Total Number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by almost certainly discriminatory measures	1214	1213	1	0
Total Number of 2-digit sectors affected by almost certainly discriminatory measures	79	79	0	0
Total number of trading partners affected by almost certainly discriminatory measures	230	226	10	0

Table 2.3 Measures implemented by G20 countries since the first crisis related G20 summit in November 2008, totals for all G20 Jurisdictions and change since the report in June 2013

Statistic	This report (September 2013)		Increase from previous report (June 2013)	
	Total	Total except unfair trade and safeguard measures	Total	Total except unfair trade and safeguard measures
Total number of measures in GTA database	1993	1557	192	166
Total number of measures coded green	466	460	61	61
Total number of measures coded amber	168	162	26	26
Total number of measures coded red	1359	935	105	79
Total Number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by almost certainly discriminatory measures	1210	1209	99	106
Total Number of 2-digit sectors affected by almost certainly discriminatory measures	79	79	0	0
Total number of trading partners affected by almost certainly discriminatory measures	217	216	0	0

Table 2.4 Measures implemented since the first crisis-related G20 summit in November 2008 that are still in force

Statistic	World		G20 only	
	Total	Total except unfair trade and safeguard measures	Total	Total except unfair trade and safeguard measures
Total number of measures in GTA database	2716	2227	1746	1334
Total number of measures coded green	668	661	389	383
Total number of measures coded amber	235	229	151	145
Total number of measures coded red	1813	1337	1206	806

Table 2.5 Top 10 biggest targets of protectionist measures taken since November 2008

		Number of discriminatory (red) measures imposed on target since November 2008		Number of discriminatory measures on target and still in force		Number of trading partners imposing discriminatory measures		Number of pending measures, which if implemented would harm target too	
		This report (Sept. 2013)	Increase from previous report (June 2013)	This report (Sept. 2013)	Increase from previous report (June 2013)	This report (Sept. 2013)	Increase from previous report (June 2013)	This report (Sept. 2013)	Increase from previous report (June 2013)
1	China	953	76	836	79	88	0	269	16
2	EU27	892	78	741	78	101	2	172	12
3	USA	750	67	631	67	85	0	107	6
4	Germany	623	45	513	45	71	0	107	8
5	France	545	41	454	42	71	1	89	6
6	Italy	541	35	440	39	69	1	95	8
7	UK	530	38	441	40	73	0	89	9
8	Republic of Korea	495	41	412	39	70	1	112	6
9	Japan	489	35	411	35	76	1	91	1
10	Spain	474	36	385	39	63	0	70	5

Table 2.6 Which countries have inflicted the most harm since November 2008?

Rank	Ranked by number of (almost certainly) discriminatory measures imposed	Ranked by the number of tariff lines (product categories) affected by (almost certainly) discriminatory measures ¹	Ranked by the number of sectors affected by (almost certainly) discriminatory measures ²	Ranked by the number of trading partners affected by (almost certainly) discriminatory measures ³
1	EU27 (382)	Viet Nam (943)	EU27 (78)	EU27 (201)
2	Russian Federation (247)	Venezuela (807)	Italy (78)	Italy (194)
3	Argentina (198)	Kazakhstan (738)	Argentina (73)	China (193)
4	India (124)	China (710)	Germany (66)	India (172)
5	Belarus (120)	EU27 (681)	Algeria (58)	Indonesia (170)
6	Germany (107)	Nigeria (603)	Russian Federation (56)	Netherlands (164)
7	United Kingdom (105)	Indonesia (558)	China (52)	United Kingdom (164)
8	Italy (101)	India (551)	Kazakhstan (50)	Germany (160)
9	France (98)	Argentina (503)	USA (47)	France (159)
10	Brazil (92)	Algeria (485)	Belarus (45)	Poland (159)

Notes: 1) The maximum number of tariff lines in the 4-digit UN classification used here is 1204. 2) The maximum number of 2-digit sectors in the UN classification used is 79. 3) The maximum number of tariff lines in the 4-digit UN classification used here is 1204.

Table 2.7 Ten most used state measures to discriminate against foreign commercial interest since the first G20 crisis meeting (ranked by number of discriminatory measures imposed)

	Number of almost certainly discriminatory (red) measures imposed since November 2008		Number of discriminatory (red) measures imposed and still in force		Number of jurisdictions that imposed these discriminatory measures since November 2008		Number of jurisdictions harmed by these discriminatory measures since November 2008	
	This report (Sept. 2013)	Increase from previous report (June 2013)	This report (Sept. 2013)	Increase from previous report (June 2013)	This report (Sept. 2013)	Increase from previous report (June 2013)	This report (Sept. 2013)	Increase from previous report (June 2013)
1 Trade defence measure (AD)	517	33	476	129	64	1	90	3
2 Bail out / state aid measure	517	41	389	118	56	6	195	4
3 Tariff measure	263	31	212	67	76	4	168	12
4 Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	173	9	164	35	71	38	181	20
5 Export taxes or restriction	123	10	87	19	68	9	183	5
6 Investment measure	112	14	109	53	43	10	106	5
7 Migration measure	94	9	87	29	37	8	147	10
8 Export subsidy	83	30	75	39	51	9	199	1
9 Trade Finance	78	n.a.	76	n.a.	13	n.a.	195	n.a.
10 Public procurement	52	6	50	10	23	2	137	2

Table 2.8 Resort to trade defence measures since November 2008

Status of trade defence measure	Number
that have been initiated and currently under investigation	273
where a provisional or final duty has been imposed and is in force	476
where a provisional or final duty has been imposed but is no longer in force	41
for which the investigation has ended without the implementation of any duties	88

Table 2.9 Top 20 sectors most affected by discriminatory measures since November 2008

CPC code, Affected Sector	Number of discriminatory (red) measures affecting commercial interests in this sector	Number of discriminatory (red) implemented measures affecting specified sector and still in force	Number of jurisdictions implementing measures affecting specified sector and classified as red	Number of pending measures affecting specified sector
01 (Products of agriculture, horticulture and market gardening)	233	179	80	116
34 (Basic chemicals)	225	198	65	123
49 (Transport equipment)	193	163	72	83
44 (Special purpose machinery)	182	157	64	67
41 (Basic metals)	179	162	65	120
21 (Meat, fish, fruit, vegetables, oils and fats)	153	118	72	86
43 (General purpose machinery)	141	125	56	64
81 (Financial intermediation services and auxiliary services therefor)	140	98	41	51
42 (Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment)	138	128	56	71
02 (Live animals and animal products)	133	104	64	54
23 (Grain mill products, starches and starch products; other food products)	122	90	63	71
35 (Other chemical products; man-made fibres)	118	104	60	56
26 (Yarn and thread; woven and tufted textile fabrics)	115	103	60	52
37 (Glass and glass products and other non-metallic products n.e.c.)	107	96	65	66
36 (Rubber and plastics products)	106	99	58	53
46 (Electrical machinery and apparatus)	101	91	56	56
38 (Furniture; other transportable goods n.e.c.)	99	86	59	44
27 (Textile articles other than apparel)	94	83	67	44
28 (Knitted or crocheted fabrics; wearing apparel)	94	84	63	36
47 (adio, television and communication equipment and apparatus)	83	74	53	38

Figure 2.1 The peak in Q4 2012 protectionism is rapidly converging to totals seen in Q1 2009




Figure 2.2 Top 10 implemented measures used to discriminate against foreign commercial interests since the first G20 crisis meeting





Figure 2.3 Classification of pending measures that, if implemented, would almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests



3 The Efficacy of the G20's Commitments on Protectionism – in the G20's own words

Even though trade policies were not the cause of the financial crisis that began in 2007, spread in 2008, and resulted in what many refer to as the Great Recession, world leaders saw a role for commercial policies when they came together to devise their response to the sharpest global downturn since the 1930s.

Despite the fact that considerable effort had gone into creating a multilateral trading system in which nations took on legal commitments concerning certain policies that could be enforced through binding dispute settlement, world leaders meeting as the G20 decided on only a limited, if still valuable, role for the World Trade Organization (WTO).

The very organisation many policymakers, scholars and business people had hailed as, amongst other virtues, a bulwark against protectionism was given the role of monitoring commercial policies during the crisis, a role it was to share with the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Had trade experts been polled in 1995, when the WTO was created and at a time of bullish expectations as to what this new international organisation could deliver, about the likely future role of the WTO in a global economic crisis, it is likely that few would have anticipated such a confined role.

Instead, G20 leaders devised an initiative to preserve an open world trading system that was prominent yet non-binding in nature. For sure, any WTO member could still exercise their rights under the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding, but the commitments entered into by the G20 on protectionism were not enforceable at the WTO. Therefore, at a time when binding multilateral trade rules faced their greatest test, world leaders chose to support open borders through a different form of international collaboration. The efficacy of this non-binding approach is of interest, then, in its own right but may also shape attitudes towards the future role that the WTO could play in the world trading system.

The purpose of this chapter is not to speculate as to the reasons why the G20 leaders chose not to fully exploit the WTO's machinery during the Great Recession. Rather, the purpose is to examine what the G20 leaders have stated about their initiative on protectionism. These statements are more revealing than one might expect from summit communiqués – they certainly call into question any blanket defence of the G20's initiative for, as the years passed since the first crisis-era G20 summit took place, the stated reservations move from being implicit to explicit.

From Washington, DC to Los Cabos

The first crisis-era G20 summit took place on 15 November 2008 in Washington, DC. Although reference is made to “open trade and investment regimes” in the preamble to that summit’s Declaration, the principal commitments regarding protectionism are mentioned in the 13th paragraph. Here the Declaration states:

“We underscore the critical importance of rejecting protectionism and not turning inward in times of financial uncertainty. In this regard, within the next 12 months, we will refrain from raising new barriers to investment or to trade in goods and services, imposing new export restrictions, or implementing World Trade Organization (WTO) inconsistent measures to stimulate exports.”

This statement is an example of a standstill on certain, specified trade distorting measures. Standstills are not a new form of crisis-era international commitment on trade policy, having been announced by government leaders in both the 1930s and the sharp recession of the early 1980s.

The relationship of this standstill to the WTO accords is of some interest. As far as barriers to trade in goods and services and to investment are concerned, the statement above could be interpreted as referring to any barrier, whether covered or not by a WTO accord. However, with respect to government measures that stimulate exports, the statement could be read as relating only to those measures incompatible with WTO accords. A partial reference, then, to existing multilateral trade obligations and possibly a commitment in some policy areas that goes beyond those obligations.

At the following G20 summit in London on 2 April 2009, the assembled leaders appear to have gone further than their pledge in Washington, DC. Although the detailed statement on protectionism had slipped to the 22nd paragraph of the London Summit’s Leaders’ Statement, its content expanded to recognise the potential for negative spillovers from trade and investment policies and to include prompt notification of measures taken to the WTO. That paragraph states:

“World trade growth has underpinned rising prosperity for half a century. But it is now falling for the first time in 25 years. Falling demand is exacerbated by growing protectionist pressures and a withdrawal of trade credit. Reinvigorating world trade and investment is essential for restoring global growth. We will not repeat the historic mistakes of protectionism of previous eras. To this end:

- we reaffirm the commitment made in Washington: to refrain from raising new barriers to investment or to trade in goods and services, imposing new export restrictions, or implementing World Trade Organisation (WTO) inconsistent measures to stimulate exports. In addition we will rectify promptly any such measures. We extend this pledge to the end of 2010;
- we will minimise any negative impact on trade and investment of our domestic policy actions including fiscal policy and action in support of the financial sector. We will not retreat into financial protectionism, particularly measures that constrain worldwide capital flows, especially to developing countries;

- we will notify promptly the WTO of any such measures and we call on the WTO, together with other international bodies, within their respective mandates, to monitor and report publicly on our adherence to these undertakings on a quarterly basis;
- we will take, at the same time, whatever steps we can to promote and facilitate trade and investment; and
- we will ensure availability of at least \$250 billion over the next two years to support trade finance through our export credit and investment agencies and through the MDBs. We also ask our regulators to make use of available flexibility in capital requirements for trade finance.”

Furthermore, a statement of political will followed in paragraph 24 at the conclusion of the section titled “Resisting protectionism...”

The G20 Leaders’ Statement at the Pittsburgh Summit on 24-25 September 2009 is noteworthy in three respects. In the preamble to the Statement, the Leaders congratulate themselves for their “forceful response” noting, amongst others, that global trade flows were beginning to recover (paragraph 6.) The next mention of trade matters comes in paragraph 28 where the Leaders state that “We will fight protectionism.” Perhaps most interesting of all is that paragraph 48, which paraphrases much of the London Summit commitments after committing not to raise new barriers, etc., includes the following phrase:

“...and commit to rectify such measures as they arise.”

Unless the G20 Leaders were speculating about what might be, the inclusion of this phrase is difficult to understand if no such barriers had been erected in the meantime. As reports by Global Trade Alert and by international organisations had shown by then, numerous barriers had been erected before the Pittsburgh Summit.

The June 2010 Toronto Summit of G20 Leaders followed the formula developed in Pittsburgh but went further in one respect. The Leaders patted themselves on the back for keeping borders open, as the following statement in paragraph 35 of Summit Declaration makes clear:

“While the global economic crisis led to the sharpest decline of trade in more than seventy years, G20 countries chose to keep markets open to the opportunities that trade and investment offer. It was the right choice.”

Language on “rejecting protectionism” had evolved into that of “fight[ing] protectionism” and then of “keep[ing] markets open.” Given there are different degrees of market openness, from the perspective of discouraging beggar-thy-neighbour measures this may not have been a step forward.

The self-congratulation appears to have continued at the Seoul Summit on 11-12 November 2010, for the Leaders’ Declaration states in paragraph 8:

“Since 2008, a common view of the challenges of the world economy, the necessary responses and our determination to resist protectionism has enabled us to both address the root causes of the crisis and safeguard the recovery.”

In the accompanying “Seoul Summit Document”, the G20 Leaders stated in paragraph 42 “our unwavering commitment to resist protectionism in all its forms,” which appears a strong claim so long as one can agree on what constitutes protectionism. Interestingly, this paragraph makes the first reference to “rolling back” protectionism. The Leaders said they would “...commit to rollback any new protectionist measures that may have risen...”

At the 4 November 2011 Summit in Cannes, France, the G20 Leaders appeared to be so preoccupied with other matters that the statement on protectionism slid further down the final communiqué to the 65th paragraph. The text on protectionism was streamlined and the following statement of intent made:

“At this critical time for the global economy, it is important to underscore the merits of the multilateral trading system as a way to avoid protectionism and not turn inward.”

A commitment to reject protectionism at the Washington Summit had, at the Cannes Summit, become one to avoid it. The commitment to rollback “new” protectionism was retained, however.

The next G20 Leaders’ Declaration, made at the conclusion of the Los Cabos Summit on 18-19 June 2012, adopts stronger language than that seen at Cannes. Paragraph 26 states:

“We are firmly committed to open trade and investment, expanding markets and resisting protectionism in all its forms... We underline the importance of an open, predictable, rules-based, transparent multilateral trading system and are committed to ensure the centrality of the World Trade Organization.”

Moreover, the 28th paragraph, which details the commitments on protectionism, starts with the following statement:

“We are deeply concerned about rising instances of protectionism around the world.”

Assessment

Several observations follow from this account of the G20 Leaders’ statements on protectionism. First, is it noteworthy that the G20 Leaders did not confine their commitments on protectionism to the policies covered by WTO accords. This may reflect the sensible observation that, although the existing set of legally binding WTO commitments represented a major improvement over the rules that preceded them, governments retain leeway to tilt the playing field in favour of domestic commercial interests, because some policies are either not covered

by WTO agreements in the first place or are covered by WTO accords that could have greater bite.

Moreover, it would seem that monitoring initiatives and contemporaneous commentary on protectionism that is confined to a limited subset of government measures is not line with the statements of the G20 Leaders. That a repetition of Smoot-Hawley-style across-the-board tariff increases has not happened is certainly welcome, but at no point did the G20 Leaders confined their commitments on protectionism to tariff increases.

Second, the references to rolling back crisis-era protectionism in the communiqués and, more tellingly, the concern expressed in the Los Cabos statement about evident protectionism suggest that the G20 Leaders are not entirely satisfied with the performance of their non-binding standstill. These statements cast doubt on any blanket defence of the G20 standstill on protectionism.

Third, the reference to the WTO's centrality in the Los Cabos G20 Leaders' Declaration could be read as implicit admission of the defects of the non-binding alternative to resist protectionism adopted by G20 leaders in November 2008. If this is indeed the case, and the relative merits of more rules-based approaches are better appreciated now, then this is a welcome development. That is not to say that WTO rules afford sufficient, let alone complete, protection against the temptation to beggar-thy-neighbour during sharp, systemic economic downturns. Still, if attention does shift back to seeking solutions to commercial policy matters in Geneva, then it is likely to be well received by those jurisdictions with a strong stake in open borders whose economies are not large enough to be members of the G20.

4 The Evolution of G20 Commercial Policies During Five Years of Standstill Pledges

While the monitoring of crisis-era policy choice is an important matter, so is understanding and assessing the relative importance of the factors that affect those choices, including potentially the G20's non-binding standstill on protectionism. Analysis, however, should be informed by knowing what needs to be explained. A first step, then, is to establish what variation there has been across G20 members and over time in governmental policy choice since the standstill commitment was adopted in November 2008. That is the purpose of this chapter, drawing upon the GTA database.

To start with, it is important to recognise that the GTA database contains information on different types of policy instruments announced or employed by governments since the first crisis-era G20 summit took place in Washington, DC in November 2008. Information is also provided on when a policy announcement is made, whether an announced measure is ever implemented (and if so, when) and whether it is rolled back subsequently. The likely impact of a measure, if implemented, on foreign commercial interests is investigated.

A measure is then classified "protectionist" if its implementation is likely to create or widen discrimination against some foreign commercial interest. While this is not the place to recount all of the features of the GTA database, these preliminary remarks may be useful in thinking through what types of inter-temporal and cross-sectional variation in governmental policy choice can be explored.

It is worth considering here some of the factors that might account for any cross-sectional and inter-temporal variation in policy choice. Of course, the longstanding economics, political science and historical literatures on policy choices that implicate international commerce, in particular during times of systemic economic crisis, are relevant.

While all the G20 governments endured the recent global economic crisis and associated Great Recession, the impact of this worldwide economic shock differed across G20 countries, as did the speed of economic recovery. The resort to trade liberalisation as well as to beggar-thy-neighbour acts may well have been influenced by the differential impact of the crisis and by the expectations (often fears) that it engendered.

Cross-sectional variation in policy choice may well have been induced by differences in inherited economic, political, constitutional and trade policymaking structures. Some countries, such as Russia, appear to have reacted to

the crisis by undertaking a large shift in economic strategy (in Russia's case, with a potentially contradictory cocktail of import substitution-based industrialisation and accession to the World Trade Organization), while other countries, such as China, stuck to established plans to restructure or rebalance their economies. In short, there are plenty of reasons why the governments of the world's largest economies might not have reacted the same way to the recent global economic crisis and its aftermath, even if they did all agree at the G20 to the same standstill against protectionism.

A final preliminary remark is in order. The data presented in this chapter refers principally to the choices of governments and typically involves counts of different types of policy choice. While such counts can be revealing, no implicit assumption is made that any pair of choices have the same economic, political, diplomatic or geographical effects. With even more information, there are undoubtedly more sophisticated – maybe more compelling – ways to summarise policy choices. Still, a good place to start is with unweighted counts, not least because it might stimulate ideas for improvements and hypothesis formation, as well as provide a benchmark for subsequent, more sophisticated analyses.


The remainder of this chapter is split into five empirical sections, each covering a different aspect of the factual record, and is followed by some concluding remarks.

The propensity towards trade liberalisation and protectionism in aggregate

Bearing in mind that global financial markets froze in 2008 and that 2009 saw sharp declines in national output in many large industrialised economies and growth slowdowns in the emerging markets, which in turn were followed by recoveries of varying strength, there must surely be interest in how in aggregate the G20 policy mix evolved over time.

Figure 4.1, based on simple counts of the number of discriminatory (“protectionist”) and liberalising measures implemented by the G20 countries in each calendar year since 2009, shows in aggregate the mix between measures to open and close national borders to cross-border commerce. If anything, the mix has shifted away from protectionism towards liberalisation during the past five years, with the former accounting for less than 20 per cent of all measures imposed during 2009 (the year when arguably fears were greatest) and rising to above 30 per cent for measures imposed in the year to date, 2013.

Figure 4.1 The share of liberalising or neutral G20 measures is creeping up slowly over time, but has yet to exceed 35 per cent of any year's total



It is appropriate to mention at this point that reporting lags imply that the amount of data collected on earlier years tends to be larger, so wider revisions to the data for the years 2011 to 2013 can be expected. Those interested in learning more about the impact of reporting lags are referred to Chapter 5 of this report.


Propensity for trade liberalisation

With respect to the propensity to resort to trade liberalisation, as far as counts are concerned, the BRICs account for the bulk of measures implemented by the G20 countries, as shown in Figure 4.2. In contrast, together the member states of the European Union, Japan and the United States have never accounted for more than a fifth of the liberalising measures implemented by the G20 countries from 2009 on.

Here, reliance on counts does matter, for Brazil, India and Russia frequently publish decrees or regulations for small numbers of tariff changes, sometimes for single tariff changes. In contrast, Mexico, which arguably has implemented the most far-reaching tariff reform during the crisis era, did so in one government announcement.¹ Those wishing to explore this matter further may want to take advantage of the counts that can be constructed from the GTA database of the number of tariff lines and sectors affected by liberalising measures.

¹ See GTA report <http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/mexico-unilateral-tariff-elimination>

Figure 4.2 In terms of counts of measures, the BRICs are responsible for the overwhelming share of liberalising measures in the G20 undertaken since 2009




Resort to protectionism

In contrast to the relative static propensities to liberalise commerce, the G20 countries responsible for the bulk of that group's resort to protectionism varied over time. During 2009, when – if their public statements are to be believed – policymakers fears about protectionism were at their height, it was the richer G20 countries that were responsible for most of the beggar-thy-neighbour acts.

Since then, however, the percentage of protectionist measures implemented by the United States, Japan and the European Union has fallen sharply (from 60 per cent in 2009 to less than 30 per cent in 2010) and the share accounted for by the BRICs has grown sharply. Together, the BRICs and these richer G20 countries were responsible for at least 60 per cent of G20 protectionism in every year since 2009.

A particularly interesting finding is that during the past five years, there have been shifts in the relative importance of different types of state measures used to discriminate against foreign commercial interests. Bailouts and other subsidies, including export incentives, were frequently used in 2009, then declined in use, and have seen something of a recovery in 2012 and 2013 (although data for these years is likely to be revised in the future to a greater degree than for 2009).

Figure 4.3 The BRICs, the EU, Japan and the US account for the lion's share of beggar-thy-neighbour policies implemented by the G20 nations since 2009




At this stage, it is worth recalling that the GTA database includes subsidies to commercial entities, including state-controlled firms, that face some form of international competition, not just export subsidies, export tax rebates and other export incentives. Moreover, less than a fifth of subsidies reported in the GTA database relate to the financial sector.²

A detailed inspection of the GTA database reveals that many industrial, agricultural and non-financial services firms have received subsidies during the crisis era and that some subventions to the financial sector sought to prop up non-financial firms. It is inappropriate to dismiss the bailouts and subsidies of the crisis era as solely being concerned with preserving financial stability, a claim that has been made to deflect criticism of the widespread resort to subsidies in certain sectors and jurisdictions.

Another finding, which can be deduced from Figure 4.4, is that the more transparent forms of protectionism – tariff increases and trade defence actions against subject imports – have never accounted for more than half of the protectionist measures implemented by the G20 countries in any calendar year since the standstill began in November 2008.

The protectionist policy mix adopted during the recent standstill and global economic crisis differs, then, from the reliance on tariffs and import quotas (often associated with the reaction to the Great Depression of the 1930s) and the reliance on voluntary export restraints (which gained a high profile in the 1980s and were associated with the response of certain industrialised countries to the sharp global economic downturn at the beginning of that decade.)

² To be precise, 122 out of 647 commerce-distorting bailouts and subsidies, including export subsidies.

Figure 4.4 The peak, fall and return of discriminatory subsidies and bailouts

Incidence of harm done to the commercial interests of the G20

Each G20 member is potentially affected by the protectionist acts of other G20 members and by non-G20 members. In so far as there is potential for harm between G20 members, this could induce monitoring by G20 countries of other members' actions, potentially strengthening the incentives of each G20 country to comply with the non-legally-binding standstill and roll back commitments.

Moreover, if in seeking to comply with the standstill and thereby to avoid disputes with other G20 members, each G20 government only imposed protectionism that harmed non-G20 countries, then the share of harm done to G20 commercial interests by that group's members should be low or zero. The facts, however, point to a different outcome, as shown in Figure 4.5. In each of the past five years, between 60 and 70 per cent of the incidences of harm to G20 commercial interests have had their origins in discriminatory measures taken by the G20.

Information on which nations are responsible for the harm done to the commercial interests of each G20 member is available too, and some of it is summarised in Figure 4.6. With the exception of Russia, for the other BRICs plus the 27 members of the European Union, Japan and the United States, again between 60 and 70 per cent of the harm inflicted comes from G20 partners. For Russia, the percentage is lower, reflecting the trade policy measures taken by neighbouring Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) nations, which are not G20 members.

Figure 4.5 Between 60 and 70 per cent of the harm done to G20 commercial interests is inflicted by G20 countries





Figure 4.6 Of the world's largest G20 members, Russia stands out as being relatively less hit by beggar-thy-neighbours imposed by the G20




Given the apparent interest at several G20 summits of the impact of their state measures on developing countries, data on sources of the harm done to the commercial interests of the least developed countries (LDCs) is included in Figure 4.6. G20 countries are responsible for 60 per cent of the measures that harm these particularly poor and vulnerable developing countries. Of the G20 members, India and the European Union members (the latter taken together) have harmed the commercial interests of the LDC nations most often during the past five years (49 and 43 times, respectively).

Rolling back of crisis-era protectionism

As shown in Chapter 3, G20 leaders added to their pledge to eschew new barriers to trade a commitment to roll back or rectify crisis-era protectionism. Figure 4.7 shows, for each calendar year since 2009, what percentage of the discriminatory measures have been removed or allowed to lapse. In the best year, 2009, less than a quarter of discriminatory measures have been unwound. Since then, the percentage has fallen to around 5 per cent in 2012 and 2013.

Figure 4.7 Much crisis-era protectionism by the G20 remains to be unwound



Care is needed in interpreting these percentages, however. First, as in the case of imposing protectionist measures, there may well be reporting lags in unwinding measures. Such lags imply that the percentages reported in Figure 7 are underestimates. Second, it is not clear that the impact of some measures can be unwound, even if the government acts in question cease. For example, a bailout given in 2009 may not involve funds being dispersed in subsequent years. In one sense, at some point in time the bailout is over. However, by enabling a firm to survive, a bailout may have enduring effects on market outcomes. In some cases,

it might be wrong to infer that the removal or unwinding of a measure also removes the measure's effects.

Concluding remarks

The purpose of this chapter was to identify and discuss key features of intertemporal and cross-sectional variation in policy choice by the G20 countries since the “standstill” on protectionism came into effect in November 2008. The description of G20 policy choice may be of interest in its own right. In addition, the information presented here may assist analysts in formulating hypotheses as to how the standstill might have affected state policy choice, bearing in mind other factors probably affect the latter as well.

An important finding is that every calendar year after the standstill came into effect is not a carbon copy of each other; in short, there is intertemporal variation, in particular, in the mix between liberalisation and discrimination, in the G20 countries responsible for the implementing the greatest number of protectionist measures, in the types of discriminatory measures used, and in the roll back of protectionism. In contrast, during the past five years there has been a relatively stable pattern of the incidence of harm done to the commercial interests of the larger G20 members and to the group as a whole, and in those responsible for the bulk of G20 trade liberalisation.

As shown in Chapter 2 and in the radar diagrams produced for this report, G20 countries have differed in their policies towards international commerce during the past five years. The extent to which G20 economies contracted in the early years of the crisis, the rates at which those economies recovered, and the availability of alternatives to beggar-thy-neighbour policies – such as monetary and fiscal policy stimuli – differ, as do inherited economic structures and associated interest groups.

With information on the 2,431 announcements of policy measures by the G20 countries now covering almost five years, there is plenty of information upon which to base analyses of policy choice during an era when the governments of the world's largest economies were supposed to be observing both binding multilateral trade obligations and non-binding G20 standstill and roll back commitments.

5 Reporting Lags and Assessing the Resort to Protectionism

The problem stated and its policy significance

Accurately assessing trade policy stance is important even in ordinary times. During systemic economic crises, accurate and, ideally, prompt assessments are all the more important given that adverse knock-on effects of commercial policies across borders can trigger retaliation by foreign governments, thereby threatening one of the important accomplishments of the post-war era, namely, the progressive opening of national trade and investment regimes. The matter of accurate monitoring has taken on particular significance in recent years precisely because G20 leaders called upon three international organisations to monitor their adherence to the standstill commitment on protectionism. In short, there is plenty at stake.

There are also plenty of pitfalls. On top of longstanding and legitimate concerns about aggregating across different types of trade policy instruments (what might be thought of as the “apples and oranges problem”), the reality is that there are differences across jurisdictions and across policy instruments in the time that is typically needed to identify and assess state measures that affect the many different types of cross-border commerce (trading, investing, licensing, migration, etc.)

These differences arise for a number of reasons. Some policy changes, such as an increase in a tariff rate, are relatively easy to understand and are often announced publicly to importers and their agents. In the internet age, many such announcements can be found quickly and at little cost.

In contrast, some other policies are much harder to understand or are reported in a manner that requires careful investigation or expert knowledge, not just of the technical details but also of local languages. Moreover, in some cases central government may deliberately take steps to hide favouritism towards domestic firms, investors, and workers. One way to hide favouritism is to effectively “outsource” its implementation to a state or private body or level of government whose procedures are less transparent. Another way is to choose means to implement favouritism that are new, unusual or less frequently used, all of which may be harder for third parties to document.

To the extent that a government is obliged by a WTO accord or a regional trade agreement to make public notifications about certain policy measures, then this facilitates reporting by third parties. However, not every policy that can harm foreign commercial interests is subject to reporting requirements and, even then,

there is still the important matter of the incentives a government faces to notify accurately and promptly.

All in all, there are good reasons to doubt that any monitoring initiative on commercial policy will be able to document immediately every major policy change affecting foreign commercial interests. Worse, that some policy changes are easier to spot than others and that some governments make announcements sooner and are easier to follow than others risks generating biased results and consequently misleading experts, officials and the media. It would not be desirable, for example, to inadvertently commend a government for refraining from protectionism when, in fact, due to slow publication of state measures or deliberate concealment of the same, that government's record appears better than others.

Two countervailing factors: expertise and time

Two forms of redress for inevitable reporting lags are expertise and time. Repeated investigation and experience in identification and reporting state measures helps reduce reporting lags. Another mitigating factor, which is the subject of this chapter, is to assess policy stance over a period of time sometime after that period is over and, when comparing across time periods, to compare performance at similar stages in the reporting cycle.

If the probability that a state measure is discovered and accurately assessed rises with the time since implementation, then instant readings on contemporaneous protectionism almost certainly understate the true quantum of protectionism. The same considerations may well apply to state measures that liberalise trade; however, governments tend to be keener to trumpet such initiatives.

Evidence of reporting lags

After almost five years of data collection on contemporary policies that affect – positively or negatively – foreign commercial interests, what can be learned about the extent of reporting lags? For example, as implied in the last paragraph, are the reporting lags for liberalising trade policies shorter than for protectionist trade policies?

The data collected by the Global Trade Alert team show that for every calendar year since 2009, some measures implemented during a year were not identified and reported until after that year was over. To see this, consider Table 5.1. The latest update of the GTA database was completed on 19 August 2013. As reported in the top left-hand panel of Table 5.1, by 19 August 2013 a total of 730 measures of all types that had been implemented in the calendar year 2009 were included in the GTA database. Three years earlier, that is, on 19 August 2010, 538 measures implemented during 2009 had been identified. Therefore, 26 per cent of the total number (730) of measures ever found were identified in the three years after 19 August 2010, a date that is two-thirds of a year after the close of the

implementation year (2009). Although the proportions vary somewhat, similar lags are found for subsets of the GTA database (protectionist versus liberalising measures, G20 protectionist versus G20 liberalising measures, etc.)

The next step is to examine whether reporting lags are more severe for some types of country or types of policy instrument. Is it the case, for example, that, as a proportion of the total number of measures found, relatively more transparent policy instruments are found sooner than murkier measures? To examine such matters over the longest available time horizon, the focus here will be on those measures implemented in the calendar year 2009. Taking the same date in each subsequent year (19 August), how quickly were different types of information collected?

In terms of the global dataset, a comparison along the row in Table 1 for measures with inception (implementation) dates in 2009 between tariffs and trade defence measures and other measures reveals that, by 19 August 2010, 77 per cent of the former and 72 per cent of the latter measures had been found. However, at subsequent reporting anniversaries (19 August 2011, 19 August 2012, etc.), the gaps between these percentages had narrowed considerably. Overall, then, initially transparent trade policy measures were reported faster than murkier measures, but six quarters after the end of the implementation period (that is, after 31 December 2009), the rates of reporting converge.

When attention is focused on protectionist measures – that is, measures that introduce or extend discrimination against a foreign commercial interest – a different pattern emerges (see lower panels of Table 5.1). For measures implemented during 2009, by the first reporting anniversary (19 August 2010), 86 per cent of all measures found had been reported. The comparable percentage for murkier policies is 73. At the next two reporting anniversaries, gaps between these two reporting percentages persist. In terms of assessing global totals for protectionism, then, this suggests that earlier reported totals will overstate the extent of resort to tariffs and trade defence measures. Correspondingly, initial estimates of the resort to murkier protectionism are likely to be too low.

Do these two findings carry over to the data on the G20 members? Not exactly. The second finding mentioned just above – where the focus was on different types of protectionist measures – carries over to the G20 data. With respect to all measures, protectionist or otherwise, there are differences between the G20 data subset and the global dataset. First, as a percentage of the total number of measures ever reported, more G20 measures are reported sooner than in the global dataset. Second, transparent G20 measures are reported sooner than transparent measures for non-G20 countries.

Having established these differences in reporting lags, attention now turns to the implications for assessing the resort to protectionism, the central matter that arises in monitoring government policy choice.

Implications for assessing the resort to protectionism since the G20 standstill came into effect

The principal concern should now be apparent. If no account is taken of the length of time available to identify and investigate measures, then the total numbers of measures reported for earlier years will – everything else equal – be higher than for subsequent years. On any given report publication date, then, if everything else is equal, the annual totals of measures implemented may give the impression that there has been both less protectionism and less trade liberalisation in more recent years. Since the G20 promised to refrain from protectionism, this might give a false impression of compliance.

Worse, if everything else is not equal, and if there is an uptick in protectionism in a later year, then, without a correction, cause for alarm would only arise if the initial reports of protectionist totals in that year were so large as to overcome the downward bias due to reporting lags. A comparison of measures implemented in 2009 and 2012 is instructive in this regard. According to Table 5.1, worldwide a total of 591 protectionist measures implemented in 2009 had been found and documented in the 15 quarters from the end of 2009 to the reporting date 19 August 2013. For protectionist measures implemented in 2012, just three quarters after the conclusion of that year a total of 477 protectionist measures had already been found. On 19 August 2010, roughly three quarters after the conclusion of 2009, 457 protectionist measures implemented during 2009 had been found. Compared to the same stage in the reporting cycle, then, 2012 saw 4 per cent more protectionist measures implemented worldwide than 2009. The mistake is to compare the total number of protectionist measures implemented in different calendar years of the same date, rather than at the same stage in the reporting cycle.

A comparison of comparable figures between Tables 5.1 and 5.2 shows that the failure to correct for reporting lags skews the interpretation of G20 performance even more. At the same stage in the reporting cycle, G20 countries implemented 23 per cent more protectionist measures in 2012 than in 2009. In fact, looking down the diagonal of the lower panel in the first column of Table 5.2 reveals that, as measured by the number of measures reported almost three quarters after a calendar year came to an end, the resort to protectionism in 2009 and 2010 was roughly the same (itself an important finding since fears among policymakers about protectionism peaked in 2009 and declined in 2010), rose somewhat in 2011, and then jumped in 2012.

As made clear in the Executive Summary, these latter findings cast the compliance with the G20's standstill on protectionism in a different light than if the annual totals of protectionism had been compared on any single day, such as, 19 August 2013 or any publication date for that matter. The policy significance of this finding is that whatever restraint the G20 commitments generated has eroded over time and that, if the G20 is serious about "rejecting protectionism", then their current approach needs to be rethought.

Table 5.1 Reporting lags for worldwide resort to protectionism

All state measures				
Global, all measures	Number of measures reported by...			
	19/08/2010	19/08/2011	19/08/2012	19/08/2013
2009	538	603	652	730
2010	302	552	611	695
2011	37	287	510	622
2012	3	34	185	615
Year of inception				

Excluding trade defence and tariff measures				
Global, all measures	Number of measures reported by...			
	19/08/2010	19/08/2011	19/08/2012	19/08/2013
2009	325	372	406	452
2010	138	276	323	373
2011	7	128	265	338
2012	2	3	76	356
Year of inception				

Only tariffs and trade defence measures				
Global, all measures	Number of measures reported by...			
	19/08/2010	19/08/2011	19/08/2012	19/08/2013
2009	213	231	246	278
2010	164	276	288	322
2011	30	159	245	284
2012	1	31	109	259
Year of inception				

Global, protectionist measures				
Global, protectionist measures	Number of measures reported by...			
	19/08/2010	19/08/2011	19/08/2012	19/08/2013
2009	171	178	188	198
2010	117	177	185	197
2011	27	103	153	175
2012	1	29	88	199
Year of inception				

Global, protectionist measures				
Global, protectionist measures	Number of measures reported by...			
	19/08/2010	19/08/2011	19/08/2012	19/08/2013
2009	286	327	357	383
2010	113	232	274	306
2011	5	114	226	277
2012	1	2	57	278
Year of inception				

Global, protectionist measures				
Global, protectionist measures	Number of measures reported by...			
	19/08/2010	19/08/2011	19/08/2012	19/08/2013
2009	457	505	545	591
2010	230	409	459	503
2011	32	217	379	452
2012	2	31	145	477
Year of inception				

Table 5.2 Reporting lags for G20 resort to protectionism

All state measures				
G-20, all measures	Number of measures reported by...			
	19/08/2010	19/08/2011	19/08/2012	19/08/2013
2009	328	360	401	420
2010	198	356	393	411
2011	32	235	386	427
2012	3	25	154	428
Year of inception				

Excluding trade defence and tariff measures				
G-20, all measures	Number of measures reported by...			
	19/08/2010	19/08/2011	19/08/2012	19/08/2013
2009	182	205	231	243
2010	73	154	183	192
2011	5	102	186	215
2012	2	2	65	242
Year of inception				

Only tariffs and trade defence measures				
G-20, all measures	Number of measures reported by...			
	19/08/2010	19/08/2011	19/08/2012	19/08/2013
2009	146	155	170	177
2010	125	202	210	219
2011	27	133	200	212
2012	1	23	89	186
Year of inception				

G-20, protectionist measures				
G-20, protectionist measures	Number of measures reported by...			
	19/08/2010	19/08/2011	19/08/2012	19/08/2013
2009	157	177	199	209
2010	63	133	160	167
2011	3	90	154	178
2012	1	1	49	190
Year of inception				

G-20, protectionist measures				
G-20, protectionist measures	Number of measures reported by...			
	19/08/2010	19/08/2011	19/08/2012	19/08/2013
2009	273	299	331	345
2010	158	289	301	311
2011	28	179	287	320
2012	2	23	121	335
Year of inception				

The G20's Resort to Protectionism: Country Tables

Table notes:

- [1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
- [2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
- [3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Argentina

Table 1. Foreign state measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests	498	469
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Argentina's commercial interests [1]	171	170
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Argentina's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Argentina's interests [2]	97	85
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Argentina's interests [3]	230	214
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests	358	345
Total number of implemented measures that are likely to harm or almost certainly harm Argentina's commercial interests	230	218
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harm Argentina's commercial interests	184	172
PENDING MEASURES		
Total number of pending measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests	54	42
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Argentina's commercial interests	47	35
MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Argentina's commercial interests but are no longer in force	86	82
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to Argentina's commercial interests	50	46
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to Argentina's commercial interests	46	42
TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Argentina's commercial interests	61	61

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Argentina" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

Table 2. Argentina's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of Argentina's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	260	183
Total number of Argentina's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	23	23
Total number of Argentina's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	39	13
Total number of Argentina's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests[3]	198	147
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of Argentina's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests	20	20
Total number of Argentina's measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests	9	8
Total number of Argentina's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests	182	135
COMMERCE AFFECTED		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Argentina that harm foreign commercial interests	503	489
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Argentina that harm foreign commercial interests	73	73
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Argentina that harm foreign commercial interests	149	149

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Argentina" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

Australia

Table 3. Foreign state measures affecting Australia's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Australia's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of measures affecting Australia's commercial interests	571	545
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Australia's commercial interests [1]	180	179
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Australia's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Australia's interests [2]	119	107
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Australia's interests [3]	272	259
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures affecting Australia's commercial interests	415	405
Total number of implemented measures that are likely to harm or almost certainly harm Australia's commercial interests	283	274
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harm Australia's commercial interests	218	209
PENDING MEASURES		
Total number of pending measures affecting Australia's commercial interests	57	45
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Australia's commercial interests	46	34
MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Australia's commercial interests but are no longer in force	99	95
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to Australia's commercial interests	62	58
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to Australia's commercial interests	54	50
TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Australia's commercial interests	59	59

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Australia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

Table 4. Australia's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Australia's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of Australia's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	77	45
Total number of Australia's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	10	10
Total number of Australia's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	23	4
Total number of Australia's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests[3]	44	31
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of Australia's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests	9	9
Total number of Australia's measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests	3	1
Total number of Australia's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests	44	31
COMMERCE AFFECTED		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Australia that harm foreign commercial interests	48	34
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Australia that harm foreign commercial interests	40	35
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Australia that harm foreign commercial interests	76	76

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Australia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

Brazil

Table 5. Foreign state measures affecting Brazil's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Brazil's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of measures affecting Brazil's commercial interests	767	706
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Brazil's commercial interests [1]	215	213
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Brazil's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Brazil's interests [2]	147	117
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Brazil's interests [3]	405	376
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures affecting Brazil's commercial interests	543	512
Total number of implemented measures that are likely to harm or almost certainly harm Brazil's commercial interests	394	365
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harm Brazil's commercial interests	326	298
PENDING MEASURES		
Total number of pending measures affecting Brazil's commercial interests	88	59
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Brazil's commercial interests	73	44
MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Brazil's commercial interests but are no longer in force	136	135
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to Brazil's commercial interests	85	84
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to Brazil's commercial interests	79	78
TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Brazil's commercial interests	70	70

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Brazil" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

Table 6. Brazil's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Brazil's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of Brazil's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	265	189
Total number of Brazil's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	119	117
Total number of Brazil's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	54	16
Total number of Brazil's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests[3]	92	56
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of Brazil's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests	90	88
Total number of Brazil's measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests	12	11
Total number of Brazil's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests	82	48
COMMERCE AFFECTED		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Brazil that harm foreign commercial interests	333	315
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Brazil that harm foreign commercial interests	38	36
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Brazil that harm foreign commercial interests	100	100

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Brazil" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

Canada

Table 7. Foreign state measures affecting Canada's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Canada's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of measures affecting Canada's commercial interests	743	717
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Canada's commercial interests [1]	225	224
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Canada's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Canada's interests [2]	142	128
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Canada's interests [3]	376	365
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures affecting Canada's commercial interests	553	542
Total number of implemented measures that are likely to harm or almost certainly harm Canada's commercial interests	386	376
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harm Canada's commercial interests	318	306
PENDING MEASURES		
Total number of pending measures affecting Canada's commercial interests	77	63
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Canada's commercial interests	65	51
MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Canada's commercial interests but are no longer in force	113	112
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to Canada's commercial interests	67	66
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to Canada's commercial interests	60	59
TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Canada's commercial interests	72	72

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Canada" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

Table 8. Canada's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Canada's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of Canada's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	93	71
Total number of Canada's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	27	27
Total number of Canada's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	29	22
Total number of Canada's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests[3]	37	22
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of Canada's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests	16	16
Total number of Canada's measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests	8	8
Total number of Canada's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests	31	19
COMMERCE AFFECTED		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Canada that harm foreign commercial interests	32	13
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Canada that harm foreign commercial interests	17	10
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Canada that harm foreign commercial interests	46	46

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Canada" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

China

Table 9. Foreign state measures affecting China's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting China's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of measures affecting China's commercial interests	1760	1254
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of China's commercial interests [1]	408	406
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm China's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against China's interests [2]	399	196
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against China's interests [3]	953	652
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures affecting China's commercial interests	1263	973
Total number of implemented measures that are likely to harm or almost certainly harm China's commercial interests	952	664
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harm China's commercial interests	836	551
PENDING MEASURES		
Total number of pending measures affecting China's commercial interests	292	92
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm China's commercial interests	269	69
MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures that affected China's commercial interests but are no longer in force	205	189
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to China's commercial interests	131	115
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to China's commercial interests	117	101
TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm China's commercial interests	86	86

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "China" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

Table 10. China's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting China's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of China's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	175	123
Total number of China's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	47	47
Total number of China's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	45	32
Total number of China's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests[3]	83	44
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of China's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests	44	44
Total number of China's measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests	27	26
Total number of China's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests	79	40
COMMERCE AFFECTED		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by China that harm foreign commercial interests	710	704
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by China that harm foreign commercial interests	52	52
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by China that harm foreign commercial interests	193	193

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "China" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

European Union

Table 11. Foreign state measures affecting EU commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting EU commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of measures affecting EU commercial interests	23	7
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of EU commercial interests [1]	3	3
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm EU commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against EU interests [2]	10	3
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against EU interests [3]	10	1
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures affecting EU commercial interests	14	5
Total number of implemented measures that are likely to harm or almost certainly harm EU commercial interests	11	2
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harm EU commercial interests	10	1
PENDING MEASURES		
Total number of pending measures affecting EU commercial interests	9	2
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm EU commercial interests	9	2
MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures that affected EU commercial interests but are no longer in force	none	none
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to EU commercial interests	none	none
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to EU commercial interests	none	none
TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm EU commercial interests	3	3

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "European Union" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

Table 12. EU state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting EU commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of EU measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	125	33
Total number of EU measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	15	14
Total number of EU measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	41	9
Total number of EU measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests[3]	69	10
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of EU measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests	11	10
Total number of EU measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests	5	5
Total number of EU measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests	63	9
COMMERCE AFFECTED		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by the EU that harm foreign commercial interests	137	73
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by the EU that harm foreign commercial interests	29	15
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by the EU that harm foreign commercial interests	122	122

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "European Union" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

France

Table 13. Foreign state measures affecting France's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting France's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of measures affecting France's commercial interests	1034	941
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of France's commercial interests [1]	310	309
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm France's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against France's interests [2]	179	140
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against France's interests [3]	545	492
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures affecting France's commercial interests	14	5
Total number of implemented measures that are likely to harm or almost certainly harm France's commercial interests	11	2
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harm France's commercial interests	10	1
PENDING MEASURES		
Total number of pending measures affecting France's commercial interests	9	2
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm France's commercial interests	9	2
MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures that affected France's commercial interests but are no longer in force	159	156
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to France's commercial interests	104	101
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to France's commercial interests	91	88
TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm France's commercial interests	67	67

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "France" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

Table 14. France's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting France's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of France's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	163	71
Total number of France's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	17	16
Total number of France's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	48	16
Total number of France's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests[3]	98	39
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of France's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests	11	10
Total number of France's measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests	9	9
Total number of France's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests	85	31
COMMERCE AFFECTED		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by France that harm foreign commercial interests	206	147
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by France that harm foreign commercial interests	39	35
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by France that harm foreign commercial interests	155	155

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "France" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

Germany

Table 15. Foreign state measures affecting Germany's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Germany's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of measures affecting Germany's commercial interests	1217	1089
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Germany's commercial interests [1]	377	376
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Germany's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Germany's interests [2]	217	161
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Germany's interests [3]	623	552
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures affecting Germany's commercial interests	908	846
Total number of implemented measures that are likely to harm or almost certainly harm Germany's commercial interests	611	550
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harm Germany's commercial interests	513	452
PENDING MEASURES		
Total number of pending measures affecting Germany's commercial interests	0	0
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Germany's commercial interests	0	0
MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Germany's commercial interests but are no longer in force	0	0
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to Germany's commercial interests	0	0
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to Germany's commercial interests	0	0
TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Germany's commercial interests	67	67

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Germany" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

Table 16. Germany's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Germany's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of Germany's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	172	80
Total number of Germany's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	20	19
Total number of Germany's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	45	13
Total number of Germany's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests[3]	107	48
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of Germany's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests	15	14
Total number of Germany's measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests	5	5
Total number of Germany's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests	93	39
COMMERCE AFFECTED		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Germany that harm foreign commercial interests	147	86
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Germany that harm foreign commercial interests	66	66
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Germany that harm foreign commercial interests	155	155

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Germany" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

India

Table 17. Foreign state measures affecting India's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting India's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of measures affecting India's commercial interests	902	810
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of India's commercial interests [1]	261	260
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm India's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against India's interests [2]	201	152
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against India's interests [3]	440	398
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures affecting India's commercial interests	908	846
Total number of implemented measures that are likely to harm or almost certainly harm India's commercial interests	611	550
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harm India's commercial interests	513	452
PENDING MEASURES		
Total number of pending measures affecting India's commercial interests	120	64
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm India's commercial interests	107	51
MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures that affected India's commercial interests but are no longer in force	115	112
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to India's commercial interests	71	68
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to India's commercial interests	58	55
TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm India's commercial interests	77	77

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "India" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

Table 18. India's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting India's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of India's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	232	131
Total number of India's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	55	54
Total number of India's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	53	21
Total number of India's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests[3]	124	56
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of India's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests	49	48
Total number of India's measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests	20	20
Total number of India's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests	111	47
COMMERCE AFFECTED		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by India that harm foreign commercial interests	551	489
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by India that harm foreign commercial interests	36	36
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by India that harm foreign commercial interests	162	162

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "India" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

Indonesia

Table 19. Foreign state measures affecting Indonesia's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Indonesia's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of measures affecting Indonesia's commercial interests	662	580
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Indonesia's commercial interests [1]	182	180
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Indonesia's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Indonesia's interests [2]	144	115
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Indonesia's interests [3]	336	285
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures affecting Indonesia's commercial interests	498	448
Total number of implemented measures that are likely to harm or almost certainly harm Indonesia's commercial interests	358	310
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harm Indonesia's commercial interests	285	238
PENDING MEASURES		
Total number of pending measures affecting Indonesia's commercial interests	74	46
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Indonesia's commercial interests	63	35
MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Indonesia's commercial interests but are no longer in force	90	86
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to Indonesia's commercial interests	59	55
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to Indonesia's commercial interests	51	47
TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Indonesia's commercial interests	66	66

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Indonesia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

Table 20. Indonesia's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Indonesia's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of Indonesia's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	114	80
Total number of Indonesia's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	17	17
Total number of Indonesia's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	26	10
Total number of Indonesia's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests[3]	71	53
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of Indonesia's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests	10	10
Total number of Indonesia's measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests	3	3
Total number of Indonesia's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests	65	47
COMMERCE AFFECTED		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Indonesia that harm foreign commercial interests	558	549
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Indonesia that harm foreign commercial interests	42	41
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Indonesia that harm foreign commercial interests	170	170

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Indonesia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

Italy

Table 21. Foreign state measures affecting Italy's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Italy's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of measures affecting Italy's commercial interests	1049	942
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Italy's commercial interests [1]	315	314
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Italy's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Italy's interests [2]	193	145
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Italy's interests [3]	541	483
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures affecting Italy's commercial interests	771	722
Total number of implemented measures that are likely to harm or almost certainly harm Italy's commercial interests	526	478
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harm Italy's commercial interests	440	392
PENDING MEASURES		
Total number of pending measures affecting Italy's commercial interests	109	61
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Italy's commercial interests	95	47
MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Italy's commercial interests but are no longer in force	169	159
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to Italy's commercial interests	113	103
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to Italy's commercial interests	101	91
TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Italy's commercial interests	62	62

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Italy" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

Table 22. Italy's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Italy's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of Italy's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	162	70
Total number of Italy's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	17	16
Total number of Italy's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	44	12
Total number of Italy's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests[3]	101	42
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of Italy's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests	13	12
Total number of Italy's measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests	6	6
Total number of Italy's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests	88	34
COMMERCE AFFECTED		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Italy that harm foreign commercial interests	161	102
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Italy that harm foreign commercial interests	78	78
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Italy that harm foreign commercial interests	194	194

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Italy" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

Japan

Table 23. Foreign state measures affecting Japan's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Japan's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of measures affecting Japan's commercial interests	1005	904
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Japan's commercial interests [1]	329	328
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Japan's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Japan's interests [2]	187	141
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Japan's interests [3]	489	435
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures affecting Japan's commercial interests	755	701
Total number of implemented measures that are likely to harm or almost certainly harm Japan's commercial interests	497	444
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harm Japan's commercial interests	411	358
PENDING MEASURES		
Total number of pending measures affecting Japan's commercial interests	109	63
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Japan's commercial interests	91	45
MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Japan's commercial interests but are no longer in force	141	140
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to Japan's commercial interests	88	87
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to Japan's commercial interests	78	77
TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Japan's commercial interests	75	75

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Japan" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

Table 24. Japan's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Japan's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of Japan's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	98	90
Total number of Japan's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	8	8
Total number of Japan's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	22	21
Total number of Japan's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests[3]	68	61
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of Japan's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests	4	4
Total number of Japan's measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests	17	17
Total number of Japan's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests	62	59
COMMERCE AFFECTED		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Japan that harm foreign commercial interests	204	200
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Japan that harm foreign commercial interests	32	32
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Japan that harm foreign commercial interests	135	135

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Japan" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

Mexico

Table 25. Foreign state measures affecting Mexico's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Mexico's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of measures affecting Mexico's commercial interests	681	645
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Mexico's commercial interests [1]	231	227
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Mexico's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Mexico's interests [2]	136	116
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Mexico's interests [3]	314	302
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures affecting Mexico's commercial interests	481	467
Total number of implemented measures that are likely to harm or almost certainly harm Mexico's commercial interests	321	311
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harm Mexico's commercial interests	260	250
PENDING MEASURES		
Total number of pending measures affecting Mexico's commercial interests	77	57
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Mexico's commercial interests	64	44
MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Mexico's commercial interests but are no longer in force	123	121
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to Mexico's commercial interests	65	63
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to Mexico's commercial interests	54	52
TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Mexico's commercial interests	64	64

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Mexico" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

Table 26. Mexico's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Mexico's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of Mexico's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	60	27
Total number of Mexico's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	17	16
Total number of Mexico's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	15	2
Total number of Mexico's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests[3]	28	9
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of Mexico's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests	15	14
Total number of Mexico's measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests	2	2
Total number of Mexico's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests	25	6
COMMERCE AFFECTED		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Mexico that harm foreign commercial interests	100	82
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Mexico that harm foreign commercial interests	27	22
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Mexico that harm foreign commercial interests	38	38

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Mexico" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

Republic of Korea

Table 27. Foreign state measures affecting Rep. of Korea's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Rep. of Korea's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of measures affecting Rep. of Korea's commercial interests	1020	883
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Rep. of Korea's commercial interests [1]	317	316
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Rep. of Korea's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Rep. of Korea's interests [2]	208	141
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Rep. of Korea's interests [3]	495	426
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures affecting Rep. of Korea's commercial interests	744	678
Total number of implemented measures that are likely to harm or almost certainly harm Rep. of Korea's commercial interests	496	431
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harm Rep. of Korea's commercial interests	412	347
PENDING MEASURES		
Total number of pending measures affecting Rep. of Korea's commercial interests	124	57
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Rep. of Korea's commercial interests	112	45
MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Rep. of Korea's commercial interests but are no longer in force	152	148
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to Rep. of Korea's commercial interests	95	91
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to Rep. of Korea's commercial interests	83	79
TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Rep. of Korea's commercial interests	69	69

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Republic of Korea" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

Table 28. Republic of Korea's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Rep. of Korea's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of Rep. of Korea's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	54	46
Total number of Rep. of Korea's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	17	17
Total number of Rep. of Korea's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	15	10
Total number of Rep. of Korea's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests[3]	22	19
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of Rep. of Korea's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests	11	11
Total number of Rep. of Korea's measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests	4	4
Total number of Rep. of Korea's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests	19	16
COMMERCE AFFECTED		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Rep. of Korea that harm foreign commercial interests	195	195
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Rep. of Korea that harm foreign commercial interests	34	34
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Rep. of Korea that harm foreign commercial interests	107	107

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Republic of Korea" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

Russian Federation

Table 29. Foreign state measures affecting Russian Fed.'s commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Russian Fed.'s commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of measures affecting Russian Fed.'s commercial interests	551	496
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Russian Fed.'s commercial interests [1]	145	145
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Russian Fed.'s commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Russian Fed.'s interests [2]	125	90
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Russian Fed.'s interests [3]	281	261
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures affecting Russian Fed.'s commercial interests	401	381
Total number of implemented measures that are likely to harm or almost certainly harm Russian Fed.'s commercial interests	290	270
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harm Russian Fed.'s commercial interests	235	216
PENDING MEASURES		
Total number of pending measures affecting Russian Fed.'s commercial interests	72	38
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Russian Fed.'s commercial interests	63	29
MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Russian Fed.'s commercial interests but are no longer in force	78	77
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to Russian Fed.'s commercial interests	53	52
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to Russian Fed.'s commercial interests	46	45
TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Russian Fed.'s commercial interests	59	59

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Russian Federation" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

Table 30. Russian Fed.'s state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Russian Fed.'s commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of Russian Fed.'s measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	385	349
Total number of Russian Fed.'s measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	98	98
Total number of Russian Fed.'s measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	40	31
Total number of Russian Fed.'s measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests[3]	247	220
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of Russian Fed.'s measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests	71	71
Total number of Russian Fed.'s measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests	21	21
Total number of Russian Fed.'s measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests	204	179
COMMERCE AFFECTED		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Russian Fed. that harm foreign commercial interests	485	475
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Russian Fed. that harm foreign commercial interests	56	56
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Russian Fed. that harm foreign commercial interests	136	136

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Russian Federation" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

Saudi Arabia

Table 31. Foreign state measures affecting Saudi Arabia's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Saudi Arabia's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of measures affecting Saudi Arabia's commercial interests	290	258
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Saudi Arabia's commercial interests [1]	69	68
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Saudi Arabia's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Saudi Arabia's interests [2]	80	62
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Saudi Arabia's interests [3]	141	128
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures affecting Saudi Arabia's commercial interests	206	195
Total number of implemented measures that are likely to harm or almost certainly harm Saudi Arabia's commercial interests	150	140
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harm Saudi Arabia's commercial interests	111	101
PENDING MEASURES		
Total number of pending measures affecting Saudi Arabia's commercial interests	38	20
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Saudi Arabia's commercial interests	37	19
MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Saudi Arabia's commercial interests but are no longer in force	46	43
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to Saudi Arabia's commercial interests	34	31
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to Saudi Arabia's commercial interests	30	27
TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Saudi Arabia's commercial interests	57	57

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Saudi Arabia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

Table 32. Saudi Arabia's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Saudi Arabia's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of Saudi Arabia's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	24	24
Total number of Saudi Arabia's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	4	4
Total number of Saudi Arabia's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	3	3
Total number of Saudi Arabia's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests[3]	17	17
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of Saudi Arabia's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests	3	3
Total number of Saudi Arabia's measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests	none	none
Total number of Saudi Arabia's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests	17	17
COMMERCE AFFECTED		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Saudi Arabia that harm foreign commercial interests	37	37
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Saudi Arabia that harm foreign commercial interests	20	20
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Saudi Arabia that harm foreign commercial interests	51	51

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Saudi Arabia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

South Africa

Table 33. Foreign state measures affecting South Africa's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting South Africa's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of measures affecting South Africa's commercial interests	523	497
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of South Africa's commercial interests [1]	147	146
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm South Africa's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against South Africa's interests [2]	130	116
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against South Africa's interests [3]	246	235
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures affecting South Africa's commercial interests	378	368
Total number of implemented measures that are likely to harm or almost certainly harm South Africa's commercial interests	274	265
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harm South Africa's commercial interests	204	195
PENDING MEASURES		
Total number of pending measures affecting South Africa's commercial interests	67	53
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm South Africa's commercial interests	55	41
MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures that affected South Africa's commercial interests but are no longer in force	78	76
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to South Africa's commercial interests	47	45
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to South Africa's commercial interests	42	40
TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm South Africa's commercial interests	69	69

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "South Africa" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

Table 34. South Africa's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting South Africa's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of South Africa's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	89	67
Total number of South Africa's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	28	27
Total number of South Africa's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	17	10
Total number of South Africa's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests[3]	44	30
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of South Africa's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests	27	26
Total number of South Africa's measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests	5	5
Total number of South Africa's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests	43	29
COMMERCE AFFECTED		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by South Africa that harm foreign commercial interests	70	60
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by South Africa that harm foreign commercial interests	20	18
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by South Africa that harm foreign commercial interests	90	90

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "South Africa" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

Turkey

Table 35. Foreign state measures affecting Turkey's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Turkey's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of measures affecting Turkey's commercial interests	712	657
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Turkey's commercial interests [1]	193	192
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Turkey's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Turkey's interests [2]	160	127
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Turkey's interests [3]	359	338
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures affecting Turkey's commercial interests	506	487
Total number of implemented measures that are likely to harm or almost certainly harm Turkey's commercial interests	358	340
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harm Turkey's commercial interests	279	261
PENDING MEASURES		
Total number of pending measures affecting Turkey's commercial interests	81	48
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Turkey's commercial interests	73	40
MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Turkey's commercial interests but are no longer in force	125	122
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to Turkey's commercial interests	88	85
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to Turkey's commercial interests	80	77
TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Turkey's commercial interests	66	66

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Turkey" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

Table 36. Turkey's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Turkey's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of Turkey's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	69	21
Total number of Turkey's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	8	8
Total number of Turkey's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	16	2
Total number of Turkey's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests[3]	45	11
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of Turkey's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests	8	8
Total number of Turkey's measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests	1	1
Total number of Turkey's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests	45	11
COMMERCE AFFECTED		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Turkey that harm foreign commercial interests	93	55
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Turkey that harm foreign commercial interests	22	7
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Turkey that harm foreign commercial interests	74	74

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Turkey" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

United Kingdom

Table 37. Foreign state measures affecting the UK's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting the UK's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of measures affecting the UK's commercial interests	1033	954
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of the UK's commercial interests [1]	311	310
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm the UK's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against the UK's interests [2]	192	159
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against the UK's interests [3]	530	485
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures affecting the UK's commercial interests	779	736
Total number of implemented measures that are likely to harm or almost certainly harm the UK's commercial interests	531	489
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harm the UK's commercial interests	441	399
PENDING MEASURES		
Total number of pending measures affecting the UK's commercial interests	106	73
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm the UK's commercial interests	89	56
MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures that affected the UK's commercial interests but are no longer in force	148	145
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to the UK's commercial interests	102	99
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to the UK's commercial interests	89	86
TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm the UK's commercial interests	70	70

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

Table 38. the UK's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting the UK's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of the UK's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	169	77
Total number of the UK's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	19	18
Total number of the UK's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	45	13
Total number of the UK's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests[3]	105	46
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of the UK's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests	15	14
Total number of the UK's measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests	7	7
Total number of the UK's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests	88	34
COMMERCE AFFECTED		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by the UK that harm foreign commercial interests	242	194
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by the UK that harm foreign commercial interests	43	43
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by the UK that harm foreign commercial interests	146	146

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

United States of America

Table 39. Foreign state measures affecting the US's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting the US's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of measures affecting the US's commercial interests	1438	1274
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of the US's commercial interests [1]	460	457
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm the US's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against the US's interests [2]	228	157
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against the US's interests [3]	750	660
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures affecting the US's commercial interests	1094	1010
Total number of implemented measures that are likely to harm or almost certainly harm the US's commercial interests	738	657
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harm the US's commercial interests	631	551
PENDING MEASURES		
Total number of pending measures affecting the US's commercial interests	125	55
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm the US's commercial interests	107	37
MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE		
Total number of implemented measures that affected the US's commercial interests but are no longer in force	219	209
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to the US's commercial interests	133	123
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to the US's commercial interests	119	109
TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm the US's commercial interests	82	82

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "United States of America" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

Table 40. the US's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting the US's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
ALL MEASURES		
Total number of the US's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	187	132
Total number of the US's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	25	25
Total number of the US's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	113	79
Total number of the US's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests[3]	49	28
MEASURES STILL IN FORCE		
Total number of the US's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests	7	7
Total number of the US's measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests	8	7
Total number of the US's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests	45	24
COMMERCE AFFECTED		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by the US that harm foreign commercial interests	195	172
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by the US that harm foreign commercial interests	47	44
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by the US that harm foreign commercial interests	132	132

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "United States of America" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

For the past five years, leaders of the G20 countries have said they would not implement new trade restrictions, WTO-inconsistent export subsidies, or export taxes and quotas. They also promised to "roll back" any crisis-era protectionism that was imposed. Drawing upon nearly 3,800 separate reports of trade-related government measures collected and published by the Global Trade Alert team, this Report contains the most up-to-date and comprehensive assessment of adherence to the G20's "standstill" on protectionism. At a time when the World Trade Organization is in the doldrums, the performance of this non-binding alternative to inter-governmental cooperation on commercial policies takes on greater significance.

This Report may be of interest to government officials, scholars, analysts, media experts, and students interested in how the governments of the world's largest economies have mixed trade liberalisation and beggar-thy-neighbour policies as the Great Recession has unfolded. The Report contains six new measures of the resort to protectionism and the propensity to unwind it, computed and reported for each G20 member. Such measures, which can be tracked over time, will add to the transparency of the world trading system.

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